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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the determinants of capital structure of listed firms in the 
Middle East and North Africa. There is a large strand of literature that explains capital structure 
decisions in firms with the main theories explaining financing choices being: Pecking Order 
theory, Trade-off theory, Agency theory. The main contribution of the thesis is to explore 
whether family ownership concentration influences the capital structure. Family Owned 
businesses constitute around 22% of all business in the MENA region and the effect of such 
ownership structure on financing decisions has not been explored. The thesis relies on hand 
collected cross sectional data for 2015 a sample of firms from the region where family ownership 
ranges from 10% to 90%. The main methodology involves estimating a model, similar to 
previous papers’, where leverage is the dependent variable and family ownership, profitability, 
growth, size, tangibility, non-debt tax shield, and other institutional and macroeconomic factors 
are independent variables. The main result of the thesis are that family ownership concentration 
has no effect on the capital structure decisions showing that financing decisions do not vary 
between family and non-family owned business. The Pecking Order Theory seems to explain the 
managers’ behaviour of these firms from 11 MENA countries with five GCC economies, with 
negative influence of profitability and liquidity on leverage.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
One of the main focus areas of corporate finance is examining financing decisions of 
firms that affect their capital structure. In corporations, managers maximize the firm’s value for 
shareholders in order to ensure the maximum return for equity holders after paying the claims of 
government, in form of taxes, and debt-holders, in form of principal and interest payments. Had 
markets been perfect in terms of costs and information quality, the value of the firm would have 
been indifferent from the managers’ choice of debt-equity mix, as argued by Modigliani and 
Miller in 1958 who initiated the long standing theories regarding capital structure. Nevertheless, 
in an imperfect world, costs of financial distress that arise from increasing leverage are real, 
since the firm takes a financial commitment to pay borrowed funds with interest regardless of the 
prevailing market conditions, which may not necessarily be in favour of the firm. On the other 
hand, issuing equity gives misleading signals to investors that may result in unfavourable 
consequences in terms of the share price and return because investors believe that managers 
would not issue more equity and risk the current share price unless it is overvalued and the firm 
is in dire need of financing.  
Consequently, theorists have built upon Modigliani and Miller’s “irrelevance” concept by 
knocking out their assumptions one at a time and formulating succeeding theories such as the 
Trade-off Theory by Kraus and Litzenberger in 1973, the Pecking Order Theory by Myers and 
Majluf in 1984, the Agency Theory by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, and the Market Timing 
Theory by Baker and Wurgler in 2002. Other researchers engaged in the practical side through 
empirical research and surveys in order to scrutinize the theoretical body by examining the 
managers’ behaviour in the field work. With this vast train of thought, there has not been a 
consensus of what makes managers prefer debt or equity. Even when studying the effect of 
corporate governance factors, such as ownership concentration, capital structure decisions 
seemed to have other unobservable effects than what researchers have attempted to examine. 
The aim of this thesis is to 1) analyze the capital structure determinants for listed firms in 
emerging markets like that of the MENA region and 2) explore the effect of degree of family 
ownership on the capital structure decisions, as an additional factor that contributes to this vast 
literature. Family owned business constitute 22% of the collected region’s businesses and 
therefore understanding the effect of this ownership structure, if any, on financing decisions is 
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important. The sample of this thesis is made up of 216 firms from 30 consumer and non-
consumer sectors, excluding financial institutions, from 11 MENA countries.  The results 
conquer of previous studies’ findings; this study finds to the answer of the first question that 
Pecking Order Theory best explains the capital structure behaviour of the sample in study, with 
profitability and liquidity being negatively correlated with leverage. However, the result of the 
second question discovered that capital structure decisions of listed MENA firms are not 
influenced by the degree of family ownership, mainly as a result of the homogeneity of the 
sample in study. Further research is recommended with a focus on one country’s unlisted firms 
that are considered family business with a survey for their managers in order to touch upon the 
difficulties they may face, possibly backed with a survey from banks, the main debt-holders in 
bank-oriented economies like that of the MENA region, about their credit risk measurements and 
lending facilities for unlisted businesses.    
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II touches upon the 
importance of the capital structure on the value of the firm, reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature of the subject in study, and states the contribution of this research to the literature body; 
Chapter III details the methodology followed and explains the variables used; Chapter IV 
recounts the process of data collection and sample selection, and analyses its statistics; Chapter 
V gives a step-wise analysis for the model’s results; and Chapter VI  concludes with a 
recommendation for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
There is a vast amount of literature that explores theories and empirical results regarding 
capital structure. This literature review will be organized as follows: Section 1 discusses the 
importance of capital structure decisions. Section 2 thoroughly discusses the history of capital 
structure theories, and Section 3 explores the empirical studies that used firm-specific 
determinants and exogenous factors that may affect the management preference in setting the 
capital structure of the firm. The literature review will conclude in Section 4 with a summary of 
the main gaps in the literature and explains the contribution of this thesis to the literature.  
2.1 Importance of Capital Structure Decisions and the Effect on Firm Value 
Institutional managers take financial decisions that generally aim at maximizing the 
shareholders’ wealth and/or the firm’s value. Measurement of the latter, however, has usually 
been more straightforward. The value of a firm is traditionally measured by discounting its cash 
flows at the weighted average cost of capital; a discount rate that constitutes the weighted costs 
of both debt and equity, the firm’s primary sources of funding, weighted by their relative 
contributions to the firm’s capital structure. The optimal capital structure for the firm, reflected 
in the relative weights of debt and equity, is the one that minimizes the weighted average cost of 
capital and would thus maximize the value for the shareholders (Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989). 
Changing debt levels, and corresponding equity weights, have several implications on the firm 
that managers take into consideration when stipulating their firm’s capital structure.  
2.1.1 Role of Debt in Capital Structure  
The impact of raising debt on the value of firms is bi-dimensional. On one hand, 
increasing debt increases the cost of equity as the claim for the equity shareholders becomes 
more risky due to the accompanying increased probability of financial distress, hence making 
shareholders demand a higher return. In addition, excessive debt may hinder further firm 
investments as management will not be able to enter into new investment projects unless 
sufficient earnings are ensured to pay off debt payments and have incremental amount over the 
investment cost to turn in positive earnings for equity shareholders (MacKie-Mason, 1990). On 
the other hand, debt provides a tax shield for firms as interest expenses are deducted from the 
taxable income, leaving more earnings to debt-holders and equity shareholders (Ross, 2005). 
Moreover, debt interest payments act as a disciplinary tool for management, reducing any 
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possible conflict of interest when management has free cash at its disposal (MacKie-Mason, 
1990 and Harris and Raviv, 1990). In addition, how a firm manages its debt provides investors 
with information in case regular payment of debt contracts and during the negotiations before the 
onset of a default that would either result in the firm’s liquidation or financial restructure (Harris 
and Raviv, 1990).  However, in case of a tax-exempted firm, Geoffrey Smith examined the 
financing decisions of tax-exempted firms in US (2010) and UK (2012) and found that the 
benefit comes mainly from the firm’s leveraging of capital investments in order to increase their 
return on equity and that the cost of the higher probability of financial distress must be offset by 
the benefit. 
2.2 Capital Structure History and Theories 
The process of finding out how managers finance their firms and what the optimal capital 
structure should look like started in 1958. Since then, theorists have not reached a consensus 
about whether firm managers prefer debt or equity as a source of financing. 
2.2.1 Modigliani and Miller’s Irrelevance Theory 
Theorists started investigation in this broad field by questioning whether financing 
decisions affect firm’s value. The pioneers for answering this question were Modigliani and 
Miller (MM). Their Modern Capital Structure Theory in 1958 nullified the effect of the capital 
structure on the firm’s value given that the assumptions of a perfect market hold: 1) absence of 
brokerage costs, taxes, information asymmetry between investors and management, and 
bankruptcy costs, 2) consistent borrowing rate for investors and corporations, and 3) the 
independence of net profit before interest and taxes from debt (Graham, 2003).  MM assumed 
that an increase in leverage will render equity more risky and hence result in a higher cost of 
equity to a level that makes the weighted average cost of capital constant; in other words, cost of 
equity will increase as the weight of debt increases, making the final product of weighted debt 
cost balanced with the weighted equity cost and the total cost of capital unchanged from the case 
of unlevered firm. Relaxing the no-corporate-tax assumption, MM claimed that the tax 
deductibility of interest payments, as opposed to the taxed dividend income, would increase the 
value of leveraged firms compared to that of unlevered firms, benefitting from the tax shield of 
interest payments (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Afterwards, Miller in the 1970s further 
developed the theory to include personal taxes on firms and studied the effect of the stock 
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income’s corporate and personal tax and the income tax on debt. He argued that taxes on debt 
and equity would most probably outbalance, neutralising the effect of leverage on the firm’s 
value (Bradley et al, 1984).   
2.2.2 Trade-off Theories 
Relaxing the no-bankruptcy costs assumption, Kraus and Litzenberger in 1973 argued 
that there is a trade-off between debt tax benefits and the increased probability of financial 
distress associated with higher debt (Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989). As financing depends more 
on debt, interest payments will reduce taxes and hence work as a tax shield that would allocate 
more earnings to investors (in the form of debt service) and less to the government (in the form 
of payable taxes). Holding the firm’s total assets and investment plans constant, Stewart Myers 
(1984) explained that the trade-off between the costs and benefits of the use of debt might result 
in an optimal capital structure, under the condition that there are no issuance costs. Changes in 
market rates, however, do occur, subsequently changing the value of debt/equity and causing a 
diversion from the planned capital structure level. Consequently, managers adjust the firm’s 
capital structure back to the target level by issuing or recalling debt since it is found to be a faster 
rebalancing tool and has lower issuance (or adjustment) costs than equity, as the principles of 
dynamic trade-off theory imply. Accordingly, highly profitable firms are expected to have higher 
leverage as their sound financial conditions give them the privilege to issue debt, with no 
adjustment costs incurred. Therefore, any market changes should not hinder managers from 
immediately readjusting their capital structure to their target levels. 
This theory, however, has been questioned and challenged through the empirical findings 
of a number of studies. Flannery and Rangan (2006), Eldomiaty (2008), Abu Mouamer (2011), 
Elsas et al (2014), Getzmann et al (2014), Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015), Koksal and Orman 
(2015) (in case of large, non-manufacturing and private firms), and (Belkhir et al 2016) found 
evidence that profitable firms preferred equity to debt, while having the capacity to issue debt 
and swiftly rebalance any deviations in the capital structure level from the target. These findings 
reveal that firms choose to slow their adjustment or deviate from their desired target capital 
structure for a long time in case they find transaction costs outweigh the benefits of rebalancing 
their capital structure (Denis, 2012 and Lambrinoudakis, 2016). Particularly, Danis et al (2014) 
found that right before rebalancing takes place, the dynamic trade-off theory is affirmed by the 
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positive correlation between profitability and leverage; while at any time other than that point, 
leverage and profitability appear to be negatively correlated. Lemmon et al (2008) found that 
capital structure changes are absolutely time-invariant, since highly-levered firms tend to remain 
within the same leverage levels for as long periods of time as 20 years. Another research by 
Dang and Garret (2015) studied firms by their level of leverage and financial status and justified 
the asymmetry of capital structure adjustments among firms, assuming that adjustments are done 
using debt and total assets. Their sample revealed that firms with over-leverage and financing 
deficit are faster in adjusting their level to the target than those with under-leverage and 
financing surplus due to the pressure the former firms face in order to eliminate their financing 
imbalance.  
2.2.3 Pecking Order Theory 
A later study by Lambrinoudakis (2016) affirmed the inconsistency in the dynamic trade-
off theory as the sample under study showed positive correlation between adjustment speed and 
cost: as the costs decrease, the speed with which capital structure is adjusted to the target level 
decreases and not the contrary as would be expected. In addition, his study provides evidence 
that firms adjust their capital structure more rapidly when varying equity and not debt, hence 
contradicting the principles of the dynamic trade-off theory and defying the existence of an 
optimal capital structure. In an effort to survey managers about how they raise new funds, 
Kamath (1997) and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) found that 34.5% and 31.2% of their samples, 
respectively, had target capital structure towards which they adjust their debt levels. The 
majority of their samples preferred to have a financial hierarchy, with 84% ranking internal 
funding as their first option, which Donaldson first discovered in his study in 1961 (Myers, 
1984). Donaldson (1961) provides evidence that internal funding is preferred by firms over 
external financing and observed the reluctance in selling common stocks to finance their 
operations, arguing that the pecking order theory was more consistent with management 
behaviour than trade-off theories (Myers, 1984). Smith (1986) found negative firm stock returns 
as a result of announcing equity offerings. This finding was justified by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
with the prevalence of information asymmetry between investors and managers, hence relaxing 
the fourth assumption of MM’s theory to propose the pecking order theory (Denis, 2012 and 
Baskin, 1989). The financial hierarchy consists of internal funding from retained earnings as the 
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first option, external funding using debt as the second, and common equity as the last resort in 
case former options were inadequate. This prioritization resulted from the fact that 
announcements of external funding to investors give a signal of overpriced equity and hence 
cause the firm to have negative stock returns with investors rushing to sell the overpriced stocks. 
Findings of Wahba (2014), Koksal and Orman (2015) in case of small, manufacturing and  
public firms, Smith (2012), Mac an Bhaird and Lucey (2010), and DeJong et al (2008) are 
consistent with the financial hierarchy or pecking order theory. Their samples consisted of firms 
that strive to avoid the problem of adverse selection and choose financing tools that are not 
information sensitive (Denis, 2012).  
2.2.4 Agency Theory 
Another school of thought built upon the disciplinary role of debt, has been initiated by 
Jensen and Meckling in 1976. According to this theory, firms’ management may achieve value 
maximization when agency costs, caused by the diverging objectives of managers and 
shareholders, are minimized (Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989), One main reason may be the cash 
available at prosperous times that may direct managers to unnecessary expenditures and 
investments that are not to the welfare of the shareholders (Booth et al, 2001). Therefore, debt 
becomes beneficial as it deters management’s discretion by the restrictive covenants of its 
contracts and its regular structure of payments. However, too much debt may cause a 
counterintuitive agency problem of underinvestment, whereby managers become so much risk-
averse that they rarely enter into new profitable projects for their perceived high risk and their 
fear of default on their debt payments (Harris and Raviv, 1990). Therefore, the agency theory 
demands a balance between the disciplinary role of debt and the problem of underinvestment that 
may result from excessive debt, providing a theory that is less extreme than the main capital 
structure theories addressed previously (Wahba, 2014). Mac an Bhaird and Lucey’s (2010) 
findings on Irish Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) support the agency and pecking order 
theories, providing evidence that the agency theory may not necessarily be mutually exclusive; 
with positive correlations between the use of internal equity and firms’ development, the 
availability of collateralization and debt financing, and the owner’s role in securing equity and 
providing personal assets as collateral. 
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2.2.5 Market Timing Theory 
Relaxing MM’s symmetric-information assumption brings in another school of thought 
that also rejects the notion of optimal capital structure, similar to the pecking order theory 
described above. Baker and Wurlger (2002) proposed that managers time the market when taking 
the decision of issuing equity or debt; “they exploit temporary fluctuations in the market … in 
order to benefit on-going shareholders at the expense of entering and exiting ones,” as they 
elaborate. According to this theory, new equity is issued when 1) the firm’s equity market value 
is higher than book value or past market value, 2) the cost of equity is low, and 3) investors have 
an optimistic view for future earnings; while existing equity is repurchased when the market 
value and the cost of equity are relatively low. Being the first, back then, to examine the effect of 
market timing on capital structure decisions, Baker and Wurgler found that firms had low 
leverage when the market valuation was high, while highly levered firms raised funds when the 
market value of their equity was low. They built their model with leverage being the dependent 
variable and the external finance weighted-average market- to-book ratio as the independent 
variable that captures the historical market valuations; which showed a significant negative 
correlation that emphasized the importance of market timing and its long-run impact on capital 
structure decisions (Baker and Wurgler, 2002).  In other words, managers issue overvalued 
equity to transfer wealth from new to old shareholders (Denis, 2012). However, it is worth 
mentioning that several studies found the negative correlation is not necessarily a product of 
market timing (Oztekin, 2015). Chazi and Tripathy (2007) found that real mispricing, instead of 
a perceived one, causes managers to time the market; while Kaya (2014) provides evidence that 
market timing has a higher impact on a firm’s capital structure in the long run (five years) more 
than the short run (two-three years). 
2.3 Empirical Research 
2.3.1 Endogenous Variables for Capital Structure  
In order to test the validity of different theories, researchers explored management 
behaviour in choosing their firms’ optimal capital structure using variables from different firms, 
industries, and countries. There is general consensus that the main firm-specific capital structure 
determinants are profitability, liquidity, tangibility, debt and non-debt tax shields, bankruptcy 
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risk, size, and growth. This section provides a detailed explanation for each variable including its 
method of calculation and predictions from both trade-off and pecking order theories. 
2.3.1.1 Leverage 
As elaborated above, most of the studies use leverage as the explained variable whose 
correlation with the explanatory variables reflects the managerial behaviour and its consistency 
with the theoretical framework. Leverage shows the dependence of a firm on debt for financing 
its assets, whether this debt is long-term debt, with maturity longer than 1 year, or short-term. 
Most papers used long, short, and total debt to total assets ratios interchangeably; some depended 
on market values of debt such as Flannery and Rangan (2006); Hall et at (2015) used long term 
debt only; while DeJong et al (2008) avoided using short-term debt, and hence total debt, as a 
proxy for leverage due to mainly the complexity in defining short-term maturities.  
2.3.1.2 Profitability 
Profitability has several measurements; most papers used the operating income to total 
assets ratio, or earnings before interest and taxes to total assets ratio like Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), while Tian and Zeitun (2007) and Wahba (2014) used the return on assets ratio and 
Tobin Q ratios. The trade-off theory predicts a positive correlation between leverage and 
profitability; the more profitable a firm becomes, the higher the tax benefit from its debt, which 
works as a tax shield for profits. Conversely, the pecking order theory requires profitable firms 
not to use debt, since their increased profits will provide increased retained earnings, hence 
having adequate internal financing.  
2.3.1.3 Tax  
Several measures are used to consider the effect of taxes on leverage. Graham (2003) 
shows that the value of a firm with debt financing is higher than that without debt financing by 
the after-tax amount of debt (debt times the tax rate), as opposed to MM’s irrelevance model 
which stipulates that capital structure decisions do not affect the value of a firm. As a result, the 
effective tax rate shows the debt tax shield that firms benefit when using debt for financing. As 
tax rates increase, the firm will tend to use more debt in order to benefit from the increased tax 
savings. While Cassar and Holmes (2003), Mac en Bhaird and Lucey (2010), Abu Moamer 
(2011), and Salameh et al (2012) did not incorporate taxes in their model for Australian SMEs, 
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Irish SMEs, and Saudi firms’, respectively, Tian and Zeitun (2007) used the effective tax rate to 
capture the tax shield of using debt. 
Non-debt tax shield is the tax savings that result from depreciation and amortization 
expenses that are deducted from income before tax. It is calculated as the total depreciation and 
amortization to total assets and has the same theory predictions as that of the tax shield. 
Wellalage and Locke (2013) and Getzmann et al (2014) used it solely to reflect the tax shield; 
Michaelas et al (1999), Sogorb-Mira (2005), Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015), and Belkhir et al 
(2016) used both measures as alternatives to one another for robustness, while Eldomiaty (2008) 
uses it as a trade-off theory factor. Koksal and Orman (2015) incorporated it with the tax rate to 
build the potential debt tax shield in order to capture the sum of the paid interest and taxable 
income after non-debt tax deductions (depreciation and amortization).  
2.3.1.4 Growth 
Growth is measured in diverse ways in different research papers. DeJong et al (2008) 
used the market value of total assets to the book value of total assets as a proxy for firm growth, 
El-domiaty (2008) used capital expenses to total assets, natural logarithm of total assets and total 
sales, Koksal and Orman (2015) used the percentage change of sales, while Serrasqueiro and 
Caetano (2015) used the natural logarithm of total sales. Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) defined 
growth opportunities as a measure of asymmetric information since they do not give clear 
information to external creditors. Therefore, the trade-off theory expects a negative correlation 
with leverage. The pecking order theory, on the other hand, predicts a positive relation between 
leverage and growth, for the insufficient internal financing as growth opportunities increase, as 
Kroksal and Orman (2015) explained.  
2.3.1.5 Liquidity 
Liquidity shows the ability of the firm to pay its short term obligations or the availability 
of liquid assets that does not lose value when converted to cash. Tian and Zeitun (2007), 
Getzmann et al (2014), Chang et al (2014), Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015), and Mac en Bhaird 
and Lucey (2015) did not use liquidity as a capital structure determinant in their model; while 
Salameh et al (2012), Mateev et al (2013), and Wellalage and Locke (2013) used current assets 
to current liabilities ratio; Smith (2010) used the ratio of working capital to total assets; and 
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Smith (2012) and Belkhir et al (2016) used current assets to total assets. The more liquid the firm 
is, the more resilient its financial soundness is and the less likely it is to get adversely affected by 
financial distress. Sibilkov (2009) found a significant positive correlation between leverage and 
asset liquidity and emphasized its importance as it shields firms from increased bankruptcy costs: 
more liquid assets give managers the ability to use more debt since they will be able to pay it off 
using their liquid assets in case of bankruptcy, and hence the probability of default associated 
with more debt is reduced. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation between 
liquidity and leverage since more liquid firms have the ability to issue more debt. In addition, 
agency theory predicts a positive correlation between liquidity and leverage as more liquid firms 
will be able to issue more debt in order to control managers and reduce agency costs (Belkhir et 
al, 2016). The pecking order theory, however, anticipates a negative relation between liquidity 
and leverage as more liquid firms will issue more internal equity in anticipation to lower 
problems arising from information asymmetry.  
2.3.1.6 Size  
Larger firm size means more diversification, maturity, and higher credit rating that 
facilitate access to external funding (Wellalage and Locke, 2013). Smaller firms, however, 
usually face severe problems of information asymmetry that may hinder access to external 
financing or at best increase its cost (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). While most papers used the 
natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size, Kroksal and Orman (2015) –and 
Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015) – used natural logarithm of total sales, in anticipation of the 
existence of a multicollinearity problem with several measures including total assets in their 
calculation. Michaelas et al (1999) used total assets as a measure of firm’s size. Tian and Zeitun 
(2007) used both log of total assets and total sales alternatively for robustness, while Smith 
(2012) uniquely used log of total income as a proxy for size. According to the trade-off theory, 
as firms grow larger, they become more capable of issuing debt due to their financial stability 
(Belkhir et al, 2016) and their lower agency costs of debt (Wellalage and Locke, 2013). 
According to the pecking order theory, larger firms tend to have less information asymmetry and 
adverse selection problems which make them more capable of issuing external financing than 
smaller firms, however, Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016) expected larger firms to prefer more 
equity.  
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2.3.1.7 Tangibility 
Tangibility measures how much tangible assets make up from the firm’s total assets, 
traditionally calculated as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, as by de Jong et al (2008), 
Eldomiaty (2008), Wahba (2014), Koksal and Orman (2015), and Belkhir et al (2016). Tangible 
assets are used for debt collateralization since financial distress does not adversely affect their 
value, unlike the intangible assets. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relation 
between tangibility and leverage, while the pecking order theory associates the tangibility of the 
firm with low information asymmetry of the firm. Hence, the more tangible the assets of a firm 
are, the less adverse selection problem it faces, and the more capable the firm becomes to issue 
external financing (Bartholdy and Mateus, 2011). 
2.3.1.8 Bankruptcy Risk  
As the probability of financial distress increases, firms’ sales decrease consequentially 
decreasing cash flows, credit requirements become stricter leaving firms unable to finance their 
projects, and managers stop accepting new projects for their risk. Both the trade-off theory and 
the pecking order theory thus predict a negative relation between business risk and leverage 
(Harris and Raviv, 1990). Smith (2010, 2012), Bartholdy and Mateus (2011), Kayo and Kimura 
(2011) and Belkhir et al (2016) followed Graham (2000) in using the Altman’s z-score, modified 
by Mackie-Mason (1990) to measure the ex-ante probability of distress: the higher the score, the 
lower the probability of financial distress is. Salameh et al (2012) used the standard deviation of 
return on assets as a measure of bankruptcy risk. Michaelas et al (1999), Cassar and Holmes 
(2003), DeJong et al (2008), and Koksal and Orman (2015) used the standard deviation of 
operating income to total assets for three years. Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015) used the 
percentage change of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation. Tian and Zeitun (2007) 
used the standard deviation of cash flows of three consecutive years. Hall et al (2000), Sogorb-
Mira (2005), Abor (2007), Lemmon et al (2008), and Getzmann et al (2014) did not use risk for 
their capital structure model. Both theories predict a negative relation between business risk and 
leverage. 
2.3.1.9 Age 
The age of a firm, according to Wahba (2014), measures the organizational complexity 
and captures its life cycle requirements. Abu Moamer (2011) also viewed it as a reputational 
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measure, while Bartholdy and Mateus (2011), as well as Hall et al (2000) considered it as a 
measure of the availability of information about the firm, as younger firms tend to have less 
information and hence facing more difficulty in obtaining financing in the form of debt from 
financial institutions. According to Smith (2010), startups face difficulty raising funds due to 
their lack of sufficient information. The age of the firm is usually calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the incorporation year till the year of analysis. It is expected that firms with more 
years of incorporation would be in a higher maturity stage and hence would be more capable of 
raising debt backed by their financial soundness, predicting a positive correlation according to 
the trade-off theory. On the other hand, the pecking order theory expects a negative relation with 
leverage since more experienced and older firms will have the capacity to choose internal equity 
funding rather than debt or external funding in general (Bandyopadhyay and Barua, 2016 and 
Palacín-Sánchez et al, 2012). 
2.3.2 Exogenous Variables for Capital Structure  
Other exogenous factors have been studied to examine their effect on the capital structure 
of the firm, such as country-specific factors, corporate governance factors, and other factors.  
2.3.2.1 Country-specific Factors 
Some researchers investigated whether factors other than the firm-specific determinants 
may affect the firms’ decisions of capital structure. Booth et al (2001) found that capital structure 
determinants are the same for both developed and developing countries, with the latter providing 
support to the principles of the pecking order theory due to the existence of information 
asymmetries and agency costs. Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pescetto (2004) examined the 
environmental influence on capital structure decisions of market-based Asia Pacific economies 
that were affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Using factors like rule of law, legal 
protection, and ownership to capture the institutional features of the studied sample, the 
surrounding environment appeared to have a significant effect on capital structure decisions 
whose influence differs with the country’s institutional, legal, and governance disparities, and 
that the crisis has altered considerably the firms’ decisions as well as its specific determinants. 
For example, firm size had a significant impact on firms’ capital structure after the crisis and not 
before, as creditors started to become more stringent in lending small firms after the crisis. 
Bancel and Mittoo (2004) conducted a survey for “Cross-Country Determinants of Capital 
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Structure Choice” for a sample of European firms with minimal firm-specific differences across 
countries. 75% of this sample had a target debt ratio. Executives cared about financial flexibility, 
credit rating, tax deductibility of interest, earnings volatility, public concerns about the firms’ 
financial stability, and the potential bankruptcy cost, in resemblance with the assumptions of the 
trade-off theory. Forty percent of managers issue debt when interest rates are low or when equity 
is undervalued, consistent with the notion of market timing. On the country level, the quality of 
the legal system is the most influential factor, followed by the cost of capital. 
DeJong et al (2008) were the first to find that firm-specific factors are different across 
countries due to the indirect impact of country-specific factors on capital structure. Country-
specific factors such as creditor right protection, bond market development, GDP growth, and 
legal enforcement have a direct effect on leverage and an indirect effect through their influence 
on the firm-specific determinants. Similarly, Gungoraydinoglu (2011) found that the correlation 
between profitability and leverage is altered across countries with higher bankruptcy procedures 
costs and less stringent creditors’ rights protection. Ozetkin and Flannery (2012) found that 
country variations cause different target adjustment speeds due to the different adjustment costs 
caused by the institutional environment in which the firm operates. Joeveer (2013) emphasized 
the strong influence of country-specific factors for explaining the capital structure decisions of 
unlisted firms in transition economies while industry factors explained that for listed firms. 
Types of economies seem to affect the risk appetite of creditors and firms, based on their level of 
transparency, investor protection, and orientation of their legal system, as Acedo‐Ramírez and 
Ruiz‐Cabestre (2014) found when comparing the UK with continental European countries. 
2.3.2.2 Corporate Governance: Ownership 
Many researchers argued that ownership concentration affects the capital structure in the 
severity of agency costs of the firm and hence must be highlighted in the domain. Céspedes, 
González, and Molina (2010) studied a sample of firms in Latin America given their highly 
concentrated ownership relative to developed countries and the general preference of Latin 
American firms to debt over equity driven by the risk of losing control. Results affirmed the 
trade-off theory when ownership concentration is high, while preference to debt decreases when 
ownership concentration is low. Similarly, Ganguli (2013) found a strong positive correlation 
between ownership concentration and leverage of Indian firms. He explained that this result is 
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due to managers’ reservation from creditors’ control when issuing debt, hence preferring internal 
funding as a source of financing when ownership is diffused rather than concentrated. On a 
larger and more institutionally sophisticated sample, Farooq (2015) studied the ownership 
concentration on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and found opposing results 
to the former study: ownership concentration showed negative correlation with capital structure 
due to the associated information asymmetry with concentration of ownership that hinders 
managers from raising debt. 
Similarly, Santos et al (2014) found a negative correlation between ownership 
concentration and leverage for a sample of Western European countries, especially family firms 
that are more resistant to using debt for their lack of portfolio diversification and need of risk 
minimization. Papers that focused on family ownership, with samples from Canada, Malaysia, 
and Eurozone, had different results, as King and Santor (2008) found that concentrated family 
ownership firms tend to use more leverage in Canada; Nadaraja et al (2011) found that family 
ownership has no influence on capital structure in Malaysia; and Pindado et al (2015) found that 
the long-term involvement of the family ownership decreases information asymmetry and hence 
facilitates issuing debt in the Eurozone. 
2.3.2.3 Others 
Jahanzeb et al (2015) was the first, back then, to examine the effect of Pakistani firms’ 
market power on their capital structure. While ordinary capital structure determinants show 
resemblance to the market timing theory, market power gives stronger firms an advantage in 
controlling the market prices and production and thus the privilege to use more debt. Other 
studies focused on manufacturing industries in France (Viviani, 2008), US (Morri and Beretta, 
2008), and Pakistan (Sheikh and Wang, 2011), all of which support the pecking order theory. 
2.4 Contribution 
2.4.1 The Literature Gap 
To the best of my knowledge, this thesis will be the first to explore the association 
between the degree of family ownership and the capital structure of listed firms in the MENA 
region. This thesis attempts to 1) highlight the key capital structure determinants of a cross-
sectional sample of MENA firms and 2) find out whether a correlation exists between family 
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ownership concentration and the capital structure behavior of sample firms. Concerning the 
sample selection, the MENA region has been underestimated in the study of the capital structure; 
only two papers were found to explore this region: Farooq (2015), as explained above, focused 
on the effect of ownership concentration in general on the firms’ capital structure in the region, 
given its unique characteristics and risk appetite, with no special focus on the family ownership 
concentration which is the primary focus of this study.  
Belkhir et al (2016) is the first to investigate whether firm leverage is determined by the 
same capital structure determinants of major economies and worldwide for the MENA region 
and whether institutional environments affect the capital structure. The sample consisted of 444 
listed firms from 10 MENA countries: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and UAE from 2003 to 2011. Using a dynamic panel data model to 
capture the various adjustment speeds of different countries, Belkhir et al (2016) found that firm-
level variables appear to explain the behavior of MENA firms’ management through the pecking 
order theory with efforts to adjust the capital structure to a set target. The negative correlation 
between profitability and leverage reflects the slow capital structure adjustment due mainly to 
the country-specific characteristics of rule of law, regulatory effectiveness, corruption, and 
financial development and other macroeconomic factors. Additionally more developed countries 
were found to help their firms use more debt, with the dependence of firms’ capital structure on 
the country’s legal system, creditor rights protection, and the economy’s orientation as either 
market or bank-based (Belkhir et al, 2016).  
2.4.2 MENA Economic Characteristics and Political Hurdles 
The MENA region is a rather important economic player in the global trade facilitation, 
with a long history starting from foreign investment barriers to economic reforms. Recently, 
MENA has undergone several economic reforms that increased business confidence and 
facilitated doing business through transforming from state to market economies to increase 
market efficiency, liberalizing portfolio investments to provide market transparency, and 
privatizing state-owned companies to increase economic efficiency (OECD, 2008). The region 
contains 18 stock exchange markets that have been prospering with growing market 
capitalization, especially after the MSCI upgrade of two gulf countries, UAE and Qatar, to 
emerging markets, which increased the interest of international investors (Amico, 2014). Given 
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all aforementioned changes, financial conditions of firms operating in the region have improved 
significantly and management has the ability to take financial decisions more freely since the 
inception of the macroeconomic and institutional reforms. Nevertheless, since the majority of the 
corporations are controlled by family and/or government, the low level of free float in the region 
hinders diversification of corporate sectors and SMEs expansion. In addition, a major problem 
that this region still faces is the lack of diligent disclosures accompanied with lack of market and 
legal system transparency, providing domestic/foreign investors with unclear financial 
information for corporations. This explains the inclination of corporates towards internal funding 
and debt financing rather than equity in this region as investors avoid investing in equity for the 
prevailing weakness of the creditors’ rights protection (for debt) and perceived information 
asymmetry (for equity) (Amico, 2014), provided that the region still bank-based instead (OECD, 
2008 and O’Sullivan et al, 2011).  
Despite the recent economic reforms and potential global financial inclusion, the MENA 
region has recently been facing several economic and political challenges from the decline in oil 
prices to instable political environments due to increased civil conflicts, providing non-promising 
growth prospects (World Bank, 2016). Security concerns, slow tourism activity, and unconfident 
foreign investors, along with weak legal systems and private sectors, adversely affect the 
development of capital markets and the availability of financial resources (Mottaghi, 2016 and 
Ben Naceur et al, 2007). With the decline in oil prices, remittances inflows are decreasing and 
are consequently eating up the benefit of reduced costs to oil importers, not to mention the severe 
deficit faced by OPEC countries. Subsequently, countries in this region are cutting capital 
expenditures and halting investment projects, causing increased unemployment and weak 
business confidence (Mottaghi, 2016).  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Model 
As highlighted above, theorists found that debt choice is affected by not only financial 
indicators of firms but also many other firm factors such as corporate governance and exogenous 
factors such as macroeconomic, political, and governmental conditions. This research aims to 
emphasize the behavior of MENA firms in capital structure decisions and explore the relation 
between capital structure and one of the exogenous factors: the degree of family ownership.  
                                                             
                      
The equation above shows the employed regression model, estimated using the Ordinary 
Least Squares regression method to estimate the relation between the dependent variable, 
leverage, and the explanatory variables, which comprise firm-specific and cross-country factors. 
Section 2 explains the employed variables with the used calculations. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the dependent and independent variables. Belkhir et al (2016) used the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) for panel data in order to capture the adjustment speed for dynamic 
capital structure; while Farooq (2015) used pooled regression analysis to study the effect of 
ownership concentration on the choice of leverage. 
3.2 Variables 
All financial statement variables and institutional indicators are obtained from the 
Datastream of Citadel Capital for Financial Services. The variable for family ownership was 
collected manually for all firms of the original sample from Thomson Reuters Screener. As 
previously discussed, variables are defined based on previous literature workings and the needs 
of this research.  
3.2.1 The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in my equation is Leverage, which captures the capital structure 
preference for  managers and is defined as the total debt to total assets ratio, similar to Flannery 
and Rangan (2006), DeJong et al (2008), and, Hall et at (2015). The choice of explanatory 
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variables is based on literature consensus, with primary focus on a blend from the methodologies 
of Belkhir et al 2016 –especially in country-specific variables –and Farooq 2015.  
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
3.2.2.1 Firm-specific Factors 
Family ownership has sometimes been used in studying the relationship between 
corporate governance and capital structure, scarcely in MENA countries though. Nadaraja et al 
2011 defined “family-owned firms” as those with more than 5% ownership of individual and 
family members, while Santos et al 2014 required that 10% be owned by an individual investor, 
a family, or an unlisted company for a firm to be defined as family-owned. For this research, I 
start with a 5% threshold for a total of 298 firms, which is then brought down to 216 listed firms 
ranging from 10% to 90% family ownership, to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity.  
Profitability is measured by the return on equity ratio in order to avoid the econometric 
problem of multicollinearity among variables that use total assets in their definition. Other ratios 
such as operating income to total assets and return on assets are used for checking the robustness 
of the model. Growth is defined as the natural logarithm of the net sales of two consecutive years 
for firms. Since this model employs cross-sectional data, this calculation method will capture the 
growth of firms at one point of time and will facilitate growth comparison among firms, despite 
controlling for time. Similarly, Size is indicated by the natural logarithm for total assets of the 
inspected year only. Tangibility, measured by the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets, is vital 
for examining the capacity of firms to collateralize their debt. Non-debt tax shield, calculated as 
total depreciation and amortization to total assets, is used as an alternative to effective tax rates 
in order to capture the tax savings of debt, since other variables, such as effective tax rate (used 
by Tian and Zeitun (2007)) and debt usage (used by Bartholdy and Mateus (2011)), were not 
adequately available for my sample and hence I followed Wellalage and Locke (2013) and 
Getzmann et al (2014) to use the non-debt tax shield in order to study the effect of debt tax 
savings on leverage. Liquidity can be measured by two ratios for robustness, current assets to 
total assets and current assets to current liabilities; however the latter is preferred in order to 
avoid the problem of multicollinearity. Risk, obtained from Datastream as the standard deviation 
of annual net income for 5 years, is excluded from the model, following those of Nadaraja et al 
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2011, Gungoraydinoglu et al 2011, Wahba 2014, and, Farooq 2015 due to the strong 
heteroscedasticity problem that was found to be persistent with all sub-samples employed. 
3.2.2.2 Country-specific Factors 
Institutional indicators are included in the model to assess the quality of public 
governance. Belkhir et al (2016) used three World Bank indices ranging between ±2.5, with 
negative being weak, while this research uses World Bank rankings of 1% to 100%. Rule of law 
shows to what extent the country abides by the rule of law, and not rule of man, and have strong 
contract enforcement and property rights. As the country abides by the rule of law, firms will be 
more likely to raise debt since credit terms are facilitated and creditors’ rights are protected. 
Regulatory Quality measures the extent of policy implementation and entrepreneurship 
encouragement. Control of corruption evaluates the effectiveness of the government to control 
corruption and facilitate business conduct (Belkhir et al, 2016). 
Macroeconomic factors give insight about the economic environment in which the 
studied firms operate. Koksal and Orman (2015) used GDP growth as a proxy for the growth 
opportunities that the economy provides to the firm. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a 
negative relation between leverage and GDP growth, while the pecking order theory predicts a 
positive relation. In addition, an increase in the Inflation rate, calculated as annual growth of 
Consumer Price Index, increases the tax advantage as interest rates (price of inflation) increase. 
Therefore, there is a positive correlation between leverage and inflation in the trade-off theory, 
while the pecking order theory does not provide a clear direction of the relationship between 
these two variables. 
The following table (Table 1) summarizes the variables’ method of calculation employed 
in this paper and the literature reference of each. 
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Table 1: Description of Dependent and Independent Variables  
Variable Calculation Literature Reference 
Leverage LEV Total debt / Total assets 
de Jong et al (2008), Belkhir et al (2016), 
Koksal and Orman (2015), Wahba (2014) [as 
independent variable] 
Explanatory: Firm-specific Factors  
Family 
Ownership 
FAM 
Ownership of individual 
investors that are considered 
family members range between 
10%-90% 
New to Literature 
Profitability 
OI Operating income / Total assets 
Belkhir et al (2016), de Jong et al (2008), 
Kayo and Kimura 2011, Koksal and Orman 
(2015), and Eldomiaty (2008) 
ROA Net income / Total assets 
Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) and Wahba 
(2014) 
ROE Net income / Total equity New to Literature 
Growth GROWT 
Natural logarithm of total sales 
of current year over previous 
year 
Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) and 
Serrasqueiro and Caetano (2015) 
Size SIZE Natural logarithm of Total assets 
Bartholdy and Mateus (2011), Wahba (2014), 
Belkhir et al (2016), Bandyopadhyay and 
Barua (2016), and Eldomiaty (2008) 
Tangibility TANG Net fixed assets/ Total assets 
Wahba (2014), de Jong et al (2008), Kayo 
and Kimura 2011, Eldomiaty (2008), and 
Koksal and Orman (2015), Belkhir et al 
(2016), 
Non-debt Tax 
Shield 
NDTS 
Total depreciation and 
amortization / total assets 
Belkhir et al (2016), Eldomiaty (2008), and 
Koksal and Orman (2015) 
Liquidity 
CACL Current assets / current liabilities 
Wahba (2014), de Jong et al (2008), 
Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016), and 
Eldomiaty (2008) 
CATA Current assets / total assets Belkhir et al (2016) 
Explanatory: Institutional and Macro-economic Factors (INMA) 
Rule of law RL 
WB Worldwide Governance 
Indicator % Rank  
Belkhir et al (2016) and de Jong et al (2008) 
Regulatory 
Effectiveness 
RQ 
WB Worldwide Governance 
Indicator % Rank 
Belkhir et al (2016) and de Jong et al (2008) 
Control of 
Corruption 
CC 
WB Worldwide Governance 
Indicator % Rank  
Belkhir et al (2016) and de Jong et al (2008) 
GDP GDP 
Annual growth of Gross 
Domestic Product 
Belkhir et al (2016) and de Jong et al (2008) 
Inflation INF 
Annual growth of Consumer 
Price Index 
Belkhir et al (2016) 
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Chapter 4: Data Statistics  
4.1 Research Questions 
In order to highlight the key capital structure determinants of a sample of MENA firms 
and find out whether a correlation exists between family ownership concentration and the capital 
structure behavior of the sample firms, this thesis will employ a large cross-sectional sample at 
one point of time, 2015, and not panel data, as Farooq (2015) and Belkhir et al (2016) used for 
their models, since the degree of family ownership is not likely to be of a time-variant nature but 
is rather largely variant across different firms and countries. Second, the collection process of the 
family ownership variable is new to the literature since manual filtration has been conducted on 
over 900 firms from 12 countries, using Thomson Reuters Screener provided by Citadel Center 
for Financial Services. If not for the time constraint, this research could have been more 
insightful if backed with a survey for firms’ management about their preferences and views for 
the family control; since empirical research does not always provide the exact interpretations as 
surveys do, as previously discussed. 
4.2 Sample Selection 
The sample under study is a cross-sectional data set of 216 firms listed on the stock 
exchanges of 11 MENA countries: UAE, KSA, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Palestinian Territories, estimated for the year 2015. The originally 
collected sample was composed of 978 firms listed on the stock exchanges of 12 MENA 
countries, including Qatar in addition to the aforementioned. For the sake of sample size 
consistency, however, and in order to have a balanced number of observations for all variables, 
the sample has been gradually modified to 216 firms. 
The original sample has been modified several times in order to reach a balanced number 
of observations for all variables, with primary focus on the family ownership variable. On the 
onset of this research, I compiled 978 listed firms from 12 MENA countries and more than 30 
sectors from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream using the provided codes for countries with active 
stock exchanges. Afterwards, I manually extracted the percentage of shares ownership from 
Thomson Reuters Screener. The Screener provides historical shareholding reports for individual 
firms that must be searched manually with details about the firm’s non-free float shares or the 
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strategic entities’ shares in the firm. The reports display the strategic entities’ type, name, and 
historical trend of their ownership as a percentage of total outstanding shares for the firm. 
Among all strategic entities, I distinguished the degree of family ownership by taking the 
percentage of shareholding for family members and individual investors as of the year-end 2015. 
Among these 978 firms, some were excluded because 1) the ownership data were not available, 
2) the firm has been delisted, or 3) the firm is considered a financial institution, which may 
distort analysis. In parallel with this exercise, the rest of the firm-specific variables were obtained 
from Datastream by the country coding for the years 2014 and 2015 for the sake of 
measurements that involve natural logarithms. Finally, the institutional and macroeconomic data 
were collected from Datastream by country. In the filtered sample, the family ownership 
contained a range of lower than 1% and more than 95%. It was then reduced to 298 observations 
with a threshold of 5%. The final sample, however, consists of 216 firms with family ownership 
range of 10%-90% in year 2015 from 11 MENA countries (excluding Qatar) and involves 30 
sectors from consumer and non-consumer products.  
4.3 Descriptive Statistics Analysis  
The following table (Table 2) displays the descriptive statistics of the variables, for Full 
Sample with 216 Observations, backed with a comparison between the samples of Farooq (2015) 
and Belkhir et al (2016). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 LEV FAM ROE OI ROA GROWT SIZE TANG 
Mean 0.203 0.328 (0.099) 0.045 0.035 (0.047) 11.445 0.376 
Median 0.174 0.269 0.076 0.042 0.038 (0.024) 11.545 0.334 
Std. Dev. 0.209 0.201 2.072 0.088 0.110 0.378 1.708 0.249 
Min - 0.100 (29.509) (0.303) (0.855) (2.317) 5.778 0.000 
Max 2.033 0.875 3.393 0.355 0.349 1.575 15.802 0.976 
 NDTS CACL CATA RL RQ CC GDP INF 
Mean 0.032 2.332 0.466 0.176 0.024 0.038 3.079 2.723 
Median 0.027 1.418 0.456 0.250 0.030 0.060 3.490 2.150 
Std. Dev. 0.031 3.293 0.259 0.380 0.512 0.420 1.839 3.732 
Min - 0.012 0.002 (0.560) (0.800) (0.700) (0.400) (0.880) 
Max 0.301 31.381 0.984 0.710 1.130 1.120 12.390 10.360 
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My sample is less levered than that of Belkhir et al (2016), with an average leverage ratio 
of 20.3%, compared to Belkhir et al’s (2016) 33%. Also profitability in my sample is lower than 
that of Belkhir et al (2016) at an average of 3.5% compared to 7.3%. Growth is incomparable 
between this research and the paper by Belkhir et al (2016) as the data set used in this research is 
cross-sectional while they used a time-series. Firms of my sample (average normalized total 
assets of 11.4) are larger than that of Belkhir et al (2016) (4.9) and Farooq (2015) (6.2), with 
similar Tangibility to that of Belkhir et al (2016) (0.370) while Farooq’s (2015) tangibility’s 
measure is different since he apparently used gross fixed assets to total assets ratio. Average non-
debt tax shield is lower than that of Belkhir et al (2016) at 0.032 compared to 0.059, while 
Liquidity is much higher for my sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 30 of 61 
Chapter 5: Results 
This chapter extensively explains the process, backed with tables in the appendix, by 
which the model was estimated after ensuring that the data is free of multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity and robustness of the model was tested. The next sections are ordered as 
follows: Section 1 shows the Correlation Matrix (Table 3) of the independent variables to ensure 
that the model does not have multicollinear predictors except with the country-specific factors 
and, therefore, the model will be estimated in two steps; Section 2 depicts the first step of the 
model estimation with the firm-specific factors and its results (Table 4), along with testing the  
robustness for profitability and liquidity (Table 5); Section 3 shows samples for testing the 
significance of the family ownership variable (Table 7) with explanation for the several model 
estimations with different samples (please refer to Section 2 of the appendix); Section 4 finally 
shows the second step of estimating the effect of the country-specific variables on leverage. 
5.1 Correlation Matrix 
The Pearson Correlation Matrix in Table 3 shows no sign of multicollinearity among 
independent variables, for the original sample of 216 observations, except for the institutional 
and macroeconomic set of variables. A set of equations will then be estimated with each equation 
includes one of these variables in addition to the original set of firm-specific variables as 
explanatory variables. 
                                                       
                   
                                                       
                            
In other words, the regression process will start with estimating the relation between the 
firm-specific variables and leverage. Afterwards, institutional and macroeconomic variables will 
be tested one at a time, by adding one variable each regression to the original set of firm-specific 
variables (please refer to Section 3 of the Appendix for INMA regressions with robustness of 
firm-specific variables and different samples). 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
 
Several models were estimated for robustness of results and ensuring the absence of 
heteroscedasticity. The significance level used in the entire research is 5%; Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey is the test employed for indicating the heteroscedasticity; ordinary correlation showed 
no sign of multicollinearity; nevertheless, variables that incorporate similar measures in their 
calculation are expected to reflect distorted results when regressed collectively against leverage 
that is calculated as total debt to total assets ratio.  
5.2 Firm-specific Determinants of Leverage 
The inclusion of firm-specific variables in the equation is important in supporting or 
challenging the pecking order theory, resembling the findings of Farooq (2015) and Belkhir et al 
(2016). As we see in Table 4, among all variables, profitability (return on equity ratio and 
operating income to total assets) and liquidity (current assets to current liabilities) are negatively 
correlated with leverage. These findings are in line with Belkhir et al’s (2016) strong negative 
correlations with leverage. However, return on assets ratio results in heteroscedasticity, as seen 
in Table 5, and makes growth significant when used as an alternative to the ratios of return on 
equity and operating income to total assets. When replacing liquidity ratios, liquidity becomes 
insignificant, as shown in Table 6, when measured by current assets to total assets, while size 
does (with a positive correlation with leverage). This robustness check shows that 
simultaneously using variables with total assets in their method of calculation may result in 
imprecise estimations.  
LEV FAM ROE OI ROA GROWT SIZE TANG NDTS CACL CATA RISK RL RQ CC GDP INF
LEV 1.00
FAM 0.05 1.00
ROE -0.21 0.07 1.00
OI -0.17 0.06 0.11 1.00
ROA -0.23 -0.01 0.16 0.81 1.00
GROWT 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.39 0.50 1.00
SIZE 0.14 -0.01 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.11 1.00
TANG 0.08 -0.11 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.02 1.00
NDTS 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.34 1.00
CACL -0.31 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.25 -0.10 -0.12 1.00
CATA 0.00 0.07 -0.06 0.14 0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.58 -0.06 0.15 1.00
RISK -0.40 0.02 0.11 0.73 0.65 0.22 0.14 -0.24 0.09 0.05 0.43 1.00
RL -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.24 -0.13 0.13 0.06 0.05 -0.22 -0.15 1.00
RQ 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.28 -0.01 0.12 0.09 0.05 -0.16 -0.09 0.86 1.00
CC -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.27 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.20 -0.10 0.92 0.87 1.00
GDP -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.32 -0.01 -0.24 1.00
INF 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.00 -0.14 0.29 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.15 0.17 -0.79 -0.62 -0.55 0.15 1.00
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Table 4: Original Sample Results
1
 
Total Sample 
Included observations: 216 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Probability Standard 
Error 
C 0.1022 0.9843 0.3261 0.1039 
FAM 0.0687 1.0179 0.3099 0.0675 
ROE -0.0213*** -3.2688 0.0013 0.0065 
GROWT 0.0128 0.3585 0.7203 0.0358 
SIZE 0.0083 1.0157 0.3109 0.0081 
TANG 0.0600 1.0409 0.2991 0.0577 
NDTS -0.0126 -0.0275 0.9781 0.4595 
CACL -0.0174*** -4.0784 0.0001 0.0043 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F (7,208) 0.1936    
Prob. Chi-Sq. (7) 0.1922    
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
Table 5: Robustness for Profitability 
Total Sample 
Included Observations: 216  
Robustness for PROF  
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1052 1.0319 0.3033 0.1019 C 0.0890 0.8552 0.3934 0.1041 
FAM 0.0544 0.8225 0.4117 0.0661 FAM 0.0720 1.0670 0.2872 0.0675 
ROA -0.6051*** -4.3256 0.0000 0.1399 OI -0.5621*** -3.3349 0.0010 0.1685 
GROWT 0.0922** 2.2834 0.0234 0.0404 GROWT 0.0547 1.4173 0.1579 0.0386 
SIZE 0.0110 1.3705 0.1720 0.0080 SIZE 0.0121 1.4679 0.1436 0.0082 
TANG 0.0334 0.5882 0.5570 0.0568 TANG 0.0441 0.7653 0.4450 0.0576 
NDTS 0.1509 0.3328 0.7396 0.4533 NDTS 0.1011 0.2193 0.8267 0.4609 
CACL -0.0164*** -3.9063 0.0001 0.0042 CACL -0.0172*** -4.0548 0.0001 0.0043 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F (7,208) 0.0216    Prob. F (7,208) 0.1234    
Prob. Chi-Sq. 
(7) 
0.0233    Prob. Chi-Sq. 
(7) 
0.1238    
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Tables displayed onward that do not show Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test mean that Heteroscedasticity is not prevalent 
(probability is higher than the significance level of 5%). 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 33 of 61 
Table 6: Robustness for Liquidity 
Total Sample 
Included Observations: 216 
Robustness for LIQU 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1063 -0.9208 0.3582 0.1154 
FAM 0.0868 1.2426 0.2154 0.0698 
ROE -0.0223*** -3.3063 0.0011 0.0067 
GROWT 0.0193 0.5209 0.6030 0.0371 
SIZE 0.0175** 2.1223 0.0350 0.0083 
TANG 0.1191 1.6056 0.1099 0.0742 
NDTS 0.0779 0.1616 0.8717 0.4820 
CATA 0.0677 1.0022 0.3174 0.0676 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F (7,208) 0.3161    
Prob. Chi-Sq. (7) 0.3116    
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
5.3 Family Ownership Correlation with Leverage 
Family ownership is found to have an insignificant impact on the choice of leverage 
levels in my sample. In other words, family ownership is not considered a disciplining tool for 
management that would reduce agency costs (Nadaraja et al, 2011), nor does it evident the 
resistance of families to the use of leverage for its perceived risk (Pindado et al, 2015). This may 
evident that the sample selection causes no variation to be tackled when the regression is run. 
Since all family-controlled firms in the MENA region would be following the same capital 
structure behavior, the estimator will not capture significant variation among the firms in the 
studied sample or in any of its subsamples. Examining the relation with different sectorial 
groups, I further classified the sample into consumer-goods sector –with 95 observations –and 
non-consumer-goods sector – with 121 observations –and results were the same, as Table 7 
shows. In addition, I attempted to group countries into GCC and Non-GCC, which was actually 
affirmative of the insignificance of the family ownership variable (please refer to Section 2 of the 
Appendix for the descriptive statistics, correlation matrices, and regression results for the 4 sub-
samples). Further, controlling for the country by assigning a dummy variable for ten countries 
emphasized the insignificance of the variable on leverage (please refer to Section 4 of the 
Appendix for the regression results). This result resembles that of Nadaraja et al (2011) who 
found that capital structure decisions of listed Malaysian firms are not affected by the degree of 
family ownership using a panel data set. This may indicate that macroeconomic and institutional 
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characteristics that affect firms operating in the MENA region resemble to some extent that in 
Malaysia, as opposed to more developed countries/regions. 
Table 7: Family Ownership Insignificance 
Family Ownership (FAM) Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
Total Sample 0.0687 1.0179 0.31 0.068 
GCC Sample 0.0714 0.5264 0.6 0.136 
Non-GCC Sample 0.0329 0.5628 0.575 0.059 
Consumer-Products Sample 0.1157 1.2844 0.202 0.09 
Non-Consumer-Products Sample -0.002 -0.017 0.986 0.1 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
5.4 Country-Specific Determinants of Leverage 
As explained earlier, institutional and macroeconomic variables are estimated one-at a 
time with the original model in order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity in this variable 
set. As seen in Table 8, none of the institutional and macroeconomic factors was found to have a 
significant impact on leverage in my sample of study, unlike DeJong et al (2008) and Belkhir et 
al (2016)’s results that ascertained the indirect and direct effects, respectively, for the country-
specific factors on capital structure decisions. The insignificance of variables was persistent in 
country-grouped and sector-grouped samples except for the regulatory effectiveness with 
significance level at 10% that influenced the decision Consumer-product sector positively. In 
other words, the more effective regulatory implementation of creditors’ rights protection, the 
more Consumer-product firms in the MENA region will tend to use debt as a financing tool 
(please refer to Section 3 of the Appendix for the descriptive statistics, correlation matrices, and 
regression results for the 4 sub-samples). While profitable Consumer-product firms tend to avoid 
using debt (as Table 33 in Appendix’s third section displays), this finding conveys that 
Consumer-product sector is the most affected, among all corporate sectors in the MENA region, 
by the efficiency of regulation and its implementation of creditors’ rights protection; it may shift 
its preference to debt only when the regulatory environment is efficient. 
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Table 8: INMA Insignificance 
Country-Specific Factors 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
Total Sample     
RL -0.001 -0.037 0.97 0.037 
RQ 0.0087 0.3146 0.753 0.028 
CC -0.02 -0.61 0.543 0.033 
GDP -0.002 -0.288 0.773 0.007 
INF -0.001 -0.261 0.795 0.004 
GCC Sample     
RL 0.0086 0.0922 0.927 0.093 
RQ 0.0235 0.4513 0.653 0.052 
CC -0.031 -0.525 0.601 0.058 
GDP -0.005 -0.349 0.728 0.014 
INF -0.004 -0.365 0.716 0.012 
Non-GCC Sample    
RL -0.012 -0.317 0.752 0.037 
RQ -0.025 -0.627 0.532 0.04 
CC -0.009 -0.22 0.827 0.042 
GDP -0.006 -0.905 0.368 0.007 
INF 0.0015 0.4973 0.62 0.003 
Consumer-products Sample   
RL 0.0616 1.2008 0.233 0.051 
RQ 0.0635* 1.7185 0.089 0.037 
CC 0.0387 0.8385 0.404 0.046 
GDP 0.0022 0.1756 0.861 0.013 
INF -0.005 -0.973 0.333 0.005 
Non-Consumer-products Sample   
RL -0.057 -1.054 0.294 0.054 
RQ -0.029 -0.728 0.468 0.04 
CC -0.066 -1.395 0.166 0.047 
GDP 0.0005 0.0543 0.957 0.01 
INF 0.0031 0.5486 0.584 0.006 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This research aimed to explore the relation between family ownership concentration and 
capital structure of the listed MENA firms, with an emphasis on the determinants of the capital 
structure behavior. Results were somehow in line with previous capital structure studies that used 
the MENA region in their models. Results of Farooq (2015) and Belkhir et al (2016) showed 
negative correlation between profitability and leverage and positive for size and tangibility. Our 
thesis resulted in negative profitability and liquidity effects on leverage, with no dependence on 
any other variable for debt decisions. Growth had contradicting signs for both papers: Farooq 
(2015) found positive relation and Belkhir et al (2016) found negative relation. Farooq (2015) 
employed neither corporate tax effect nor liquidity in his model, while Belkhir et al (2016) found 
a positive correlation between taxes and debt usage and a negative correlation for liquidity. 
Farooq (2015) used one country-specific factor that captures the legal tradition of the country, 
with a resulting negative relation between common law tradition and debt usage. However, 
Belkhir et al (2016) had various institutional and macroeconomic factors that directly and 
indirectly affected the debt decisions of their sample; however our sample was not affected by 
any of the employed country-specific factors that were employed by Belkhir et al (2016) except 
for Consumer-product sector that tends to use debt when the environment facilitates issuing debt 
in terms of regulatory effectiveness. When examining the corporate governance determinant 
effect on leverage, family ownership showed no sign of significant influence on managers’ 
decisions, resembling Nadaraja et al (2011) who found that family ownership has no influence 
on capital structure in Malaysia, unlike King and Santor (2008) and Pindado et al (2015) who 
found that concentration of family ownership is significantly positively correlated with leverage 
in Canada and the Eurozone, respectively. The use of cross-sectional data was rather challenging 
in a region that is well-known for the inadequacy in its information. The distinct nature of the 
data may explain the insignificance of family control and country-specific factors on leverage. 
One possible area for future research is to conduct this research on non-listed family businesses 
for one country and backed the study with surveys for firm managers and, if possible, banks, the 
main creditor in such bank-oriented economies to understand the whole capital structure cycle, 
from the creditor side and debtor side. Nevertheless, this research provided an insight about how 
managers encounter challenges in maximizing the shareholders’ value and how complicated it is 
to define their behavior in taking funding decisions. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 37 of 61 
References 
Abor, Joshua, 2007,"Industry classification and the capital structure of Ghanaian SMEs", Studies 
in Economics and Finance, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 207-219.  
Abu Mouamer, Faris M. 2011, "The determinants of capital structure of Palestine-listed 
companies", The Journal of Risk Finance, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 226 - 241.  
Acedo‐Ramírez, M.A. & Ruiz‐Cabestre, F.J. 2014, "Determinants of Capital Structure: United 
Kingdom Versus Continental European Countries", Journal of International Financial 
Management & Accounting, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 237-270. 
Ahmed Sheikh, N. & Wang, Z. 2011, "Determinants of capital structure", Managerial 
Finance, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 117-133. 
Amico, A. (2014), “Corporate Governance Enforcement in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Evidence and Priorities”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 15, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
Aztekin, A. & Flannery, M.J. 2012, "Institutional determinants of capital structure adjustment 
speeds", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 103, no. 1, pp. 88. 
Baker, M. & Wurgler, J. 2002, "Market Timing and Capital Structure", The Journal of Finance, 
vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 1-32. 
Bancel, F. & Mittoo, U.R. 2004, "Cross-Country Determinants of Capital Structure Choice: A 
Survey of European Firms", Financial Management, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 103-132. 
Bandyopadhyay, A. & Barua, N.M. 2016, "Factors determining capital structure and corporate 
performance in India: Studying the business cycle effects", The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, . 
Bartholdy, J. & Mateus, C. 2011, "Debt and taxes for private firms", International Review of 
Financial Analysis, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 177-189. 
Baskin, J. 1989, "An Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypothesis", Financial 
Management, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 26-35. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 38 of 61 
Belkhir, M., Maghyereh, A. & Awartani, B. 2016, "Institutions and corporate capital structure in 
the MENA region", Emerging Markets Review, vol. 26, pp. 99-129. 
Ben Naceur, S., Ghazouani, S. & Omran, M. 2007, "The performance of newly privatized firms 
in selected MENA countries: The role of ownership structure, governance and 
liberalization policies", International Review of Financial Analysis, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 332-
353. 
Booth, L., Aivazian, V., Demirguc-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. 2001, "Capital Structures in 
Developing Countries", The Journal of Finance, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 87-130. 
Bradley, M., Jarrell, G.A. & Kim, E.H. 1984, "On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: 
Theory and Evidence", The Journal of Finance, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 857-878. 
Céspedes, J., González, M. & Molina, C.A. 2010, "Ownership and capital structure in Latin 
America", Journal of Business Research, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 248-254. 
Chang, C., Chen, X. & Liao, G. 2014, "What are the reliably important determinants of capital 
structure in china?", Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, vol. 30, pp. 87-113. 
Chazi, A. & Tripathy, N. 2007, "Which Version of Equity Market Timing Affects Capital 
Structure?", Journal of Applied Finance, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 70. 
Dang, V.A. & Garrett, I. 2015, "On Corporate Capital Structure Adjustments", Finance Research 
Letters, vol. 14, pp. 56. 
Danis, A., Rettl, D.A. & Whited, T.M. 2014, "Refinancing, profitability, and capital 
structure", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 114, no. 3, pp. 424-443. 
de Jong, A., Kabir, R. & Nguyen, T.T. 2008, "Capital structure around the world: The roles of 
firm- and country-specific determinants", Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 32, no. 9, 
pp. 1954-1969. 
Deesomsak, R., Paudyal, K. & Pescetto, G. 2004, "The determinants of capital structure: 
evidence from the Asia Pacific region", Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 387-405. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 39 of 61 
Denis, D.J. 2012, "The Persistent Puzzle of Corporate Capital Structure: Current Challenges and 
New Directions", Financial Review, vol. 47, no. 4, pp. 631-643. 
Eldomiaty, T.I. 2008;2007;, "Determinants of corporate capital structure: evidence from an 
emerging economy", International Journal of Commerce and Management, vol. 17, no. 1/2, 
pp. 25-43. 
Elsas, R., Flannery, M.J. & Garfinkel, J.A. 2014, "Financing Major Investments: Information 
about Capital Structure Decisions", Review of Finance, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 1341-1386. 
Farooq, O. 2015, "Effect of ownership concentration on capital structure: evidence from the 
MENA region", International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and 
Management, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 99. 
Flannery, M.J. & Rangan, K.P. 2006, "Partial adjustment toward target capital 
structures", Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 79, no. 3, pp. 469-506. 
G, C. & S, H. 2003, "Capital structure and financing of SMEs: Australian evidence", Accounting 
and Finance, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 123-147. 
Ganguli, S.K. 2013, "Capital structure - does ownership structure matter? Theory and Indian 
evidence", Studies in Economics and Finance, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 56-72. 
Getzmann, A., Lang, S. & Spremann, K. 2014, "Target Capital Structure and Adjustment Speed 
in Asia", Asia‐Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 1-30. 
Graham, J.R. 2003, "Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review", The Review of Financial 
Studies, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 1075-1129 
Gungoraydinoglu, A. & Ã–zde, Ã. 2011, "Firm- and country-level determinants of corporate 
leverage: Some new international evidence", Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 17, no. 5, 
pp. 1457-1474. 
Hall, G., Hutchinson, P. & Michaelas, N. 2000, "Industry effects of the determinants of unquoted 
SMEs' capital structure", International Journal of the Economics of Business, vol. 7, no. 3, 
pp. 297. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 40 of 61 
Hall, T., Joergensen, F., Företagsekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet & 
Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten 2015, "Legal variation and capital structure: comparing 
listed and non-listed companies", European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 40, no. 3, 
pp. 511-543. 
Harris, M. & Raviv, A. 1990, "Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt", The 
Journal of Finance, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 321-349. 
Jahanzeb, A., Bajuri, N.H. & Ghori, A. 2015, "Market power versus capital structure 
determinants: Do they impact leverage?", Cogent Economics & Finance,vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 
1017948. 
Jõeveer, K. 2012;2013;, "Firm, country and macroeconomic determinants of capital structure: 
Evidence from transition economies", Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 41, no. 1, 
pp. 294. 
Kamath, R.R. 1997, "Long-Term Financing Decisions: Views and Practices of Financial 
Managers of NYSE Firms", The Financial Review, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 331-356. 
Kaya, H.D. 2014, "The Market Timing Theory of Capital Structure Revisited: Evidence from the 
SEO Market", International Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 62. 
Kayo, E.K. & Kimura, H. 2011, "Hierarchical determinants of capital structure", Journal of 
Banking and Finance, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 358-371. 
King, M.R. & Santor, E. 2008, "Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital 
structure of Canadian firms", Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 32, no. 11, pp. 2423-
2432. 
Köksal, B. & Orman, C. 2015, "Determinants of capital structure: evidence from a major 
developing economy", Small Business Economics, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 255-282. 
Lambrinoudakis, C. 2016, "Adjustment Cost Determinants and Target Capital 
Structure", Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 1. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 41 of 61 
Lemmon, M.L., Roberts, M.R. & Zender, J.F. 2008, "Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the 
Cross-Section of Corporate Capital Structure", The Journal of Finance, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 
1575-1608. 
mac an Bhaird, C. & Lucey, B. 2010, "Determinants of capital structure in Irish SMEs", Small 
Business Economics, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 357-375. 
MacKie-Mason, J.K. 1990, "Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?", The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 1471-1493. 
Mateev, M., Poutziouris, P. & Ivanov, K. 2013, "On the determinants of SME capital structure in 
Central and Eastern Europe: A dynamic panel analysis",Research in International Business 
and Finance, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 28. 
Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F. & Poutziouris, P. 1999, "Financial Policy and Capital Structure 
Choice in U.K. SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Company Panel Data", Small Business 
Economics, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 113-130. 
Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F. & Poutziouris, P. 1999, "Financial Policy and Capital Structure 
Choice in U.K. SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Company Panel Data", Small Business 
Economics, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 113-130. 
Modigliani, Franco and Merton H. Miller 1963, “Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of 
Capital: A Correction,” American Economic Review, vol. 53, pp. 433–443. 
Mottaghi, L., 2016. How Do People in MENA Evaluate their Economic Prospects? World Bank. 
Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24385 [Accessed 
February 10, 2017]. 
Morri, G. & Beretta, C. 2008, "The capital structure determinants of REITs. Is it a peculiar 
industry?", Journal of European Real Estate Research, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 6-57. 
MYERS, S.C. 1984, "The Capital Structure Puzzle", The Journal of Finance, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 
574-592. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 42 of 61 
Nadaraja, P, Zulkafli, A, & Masron, T 2011, 'Family Ownership, Firm's Financial Characteristics 
and Capital Structure: Evidence from Public Listed Companies in Malaysia', Economia: 
Seria Management, 14, 1, pp. 141-155, EconLit with Full Text, EBSCOhost, viewed 16 
December 2016. 
OECD, 2008, Making Reforms Succeed: Moving Forward with the Mena Investment Policy 
Agenda. OECD, ISBN - 978-92-64-04434-0. 
O’Sullivan, A., Rey, M.E. and Mendez, J.G., 2011. Opportunities and Challenges in the MENA 
Region. Arab World Competitiveness Report, 2012, pp.42-67. 
Öztekin, Ö. 2015, "Capital Structure Decisions around the World: Which Factors Are Reliably 
Important?", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 301-23. 
Palacín-Sánchez, M.J., Ramírez-Herrera, L.M. & di Pietro, F. 2013;2012;, "Capital structure of 
SMEs in Spanish regions", Small Business Economics, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 503-519. 
Peter Smith, G. 2010, "What are the Capital Structure Determinants for Tax-Exempt 
Organizations?", The Financial Review, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 845-872. 
Pindado, J., Requejo, I. & de la Torre, C. 2015, "Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital 
Structure? An Empirical Analysis of Eurozone Firms: DOES FAMILY CONTROL 
SHAPE CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE?", Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, vol. 42, no. 7-8, pp. 965-1006. 
Pinegar, J.M. & Wilbricht, L. 1989, "What Managers Think of Capital Structure Theory: A 
Survey", Financial Management, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 82-91. 
Ross, S.A. 2005, "Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital", Journal of Applied Finance, vol. 
15, no. 1, pp. 5. 
Salameh, H.M., Al-Zubi, K.A. & Al-Zu'Bi, B. 2012, "Capital Structure Determinants and 
Financial Performance Analytical Study in Saudi Arabia Market 2004-2009", International 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 18. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 43 of 61 
Santos, M.S., Moreira, A.C. & Vieira, E.S. 2014, "Ownership concentration, contestability, 
family firms, and capital structure", Journal of Management & Governance, vol. 18, no. 4, 
pp. 1063-1107. 
Serrasqueiro, Z. & Caetano, A. 2015, "Trade-Off Theory versus Pecking Order Theory: capital 
structure decisions in a peripheral region of Portugal", Journal of Business Economics and 
Management, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 445-466. 
Sibilkov, V. 2009, "Asset Liquidity and Capital Structure", Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, vol. 44, no. 5, pp. 1173-1196. 
Smimou, K. & Karabegovic, A. 2010, "On the relationship between economic freedom and 
equity returns in the emerging markets: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) stock markets", Emerging Markets Review, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 119-151. 
Smith, G.P. 2012, "Capital Structure Determinants for Tax-Exempt Organisations: Evidence 
from the UK: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANISATIONS", Financial Accountability & Management, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 143-
163. 
Sogorb-Mira, F. 2005, "How SME Uniqueness Affects Capital Structure: Evidence from a 1994-
1998 Spanish Data Panel", Small Business Economics, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 447-457. 
Tian, G.G. & Zeitun, R. 2007, "Capital Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from 
Jordan", Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 16. 
Viviani, J. 2008, "Capital structure determinants: an empirical study of French companies in the 
wine industry", International Journal of Wine Business Research, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 171-
194. 
Wahba, H. 2014, "Capital structure, managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from 
Egypt", Journal of Management & Governance, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 1041-1061. 
Wellalage, N.H. & Locke, S. 2013, "Capital structure and its determinants in New Zealand 
firms", Journal of Business Economics and Management, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 852. 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 44 of 61 
“World Bank. 2016. The World Bank Annual Report 2016. Washington, DC. © World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24985 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wedad Mohamed 
Thesis 
Dr. Aliaa Bassiouny 
Page 45 of 61 
Appendix 
1. Risk Exclusion due to Heteroscedasticity 
Table 9: Original Model with Risk 
Total Sample Including Risk 
Included observations: 216 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1299 1.3831 0.1681 0.0939 
FAM 0.0722 1.1830 0.2382 0.0610 
ROE -0.0167*** -2.8249 0.0052 0.0059 
GROWT 0.0641* 1.9330 0.0546 0.0332 
SIZE 0.0156** 2.0951 0.0374 0.0074 
TANG -0.0556 -1.0153 0.3111 0.0547 
NDTS 0.5348 1.2652 0.2072 0.4227 
CACL -0.0150*** -3.8917 0.0001 0.0039 
RISK -0.0718*** -6.9088 0.0000 0.0104 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F (7,208) 0    
Prob. Chi-Sq. (7) 0    
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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2. Sub-samples Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Matrices, and Results 
2.1 GCC Countries Sample with 117 Observations 
GCC Sample Results show no significance for Family Ownership while significant 
Profitability and Liquidity 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics of GCC Sample  
  LEV FAM ROE OI ROA GROWT SIZE TANG 
Mean 0.1903 0.2815 0.0635 0.0536 0.0537 0.0132 11.7296 0.4133 
Median 0.1545 0.2136 0.0896 0.0462 0.0497 -0.0079 12.0639 0.4115 
Std. Dev. 0.2473 0.1707 0.3985 0.0910 0.0952 0.3508 1.7373 0.2636 
Min 0.0000 0.1000 -3.7940 -0.3034 -0.3622 -2.0095 5.7777 0.0002 
Max 2.0334 0.8581 0.5510 0.3549 0.3494 1.5750 15.8017 0.9765 
  NDTS CACL CATA RL RQ CC GDP INF 
Mean 0.037 2.907 0.433 0.324 0.289 0.185 2.824 1.952 
Median 0.031 1.523 0.398 0.460 0.050 0.170 3.490 2.150 
Std. Dev. 0.038 4.247 0.261 0.261 0.463 0.409 1.671 2.108 
Min 0.0000 0.0124 0.0018 -0.5600 -0.8000 -0.7000 -0.4000 -0.8800 
Max 0.3011 31.3810 0.9598 0.7100 1.1300 1.1200 12.3900 10.3600 
 
Table 11: Correlation Matrix for GCC Sample 
 
 
 
 
CACL CATA CC FAM GDP GROWT ID INF LEV NDTS OI RISK RL ROA ROE RQ SIZE TANG
CACL 1.00
CATA 0.19 1.00
CC -0.09 -0.12 1.00
FAM 0.02 -0.01 0.12 1.00
GDP -0.03 0.08 0.18 0.07 1.00
GROWT -0.16 -0.07 0.32 0.19 0.07 1.00
ID -0.02 0.03 -0.43 -0.08 0.29 -0.02 1.00
INF 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 -0.16 -0.17 -0.25 1.00
LEV -0.31 -0.08 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.12 -0.09 1.00
NDTS -0.17 -0.11 -0.06 -0.16 0.01 0.01 0.15 -0.05 0.06 1.00
OI -0.11 0.06 -0.06 0.12 0.13 0.41 0.18 -0.03 -0.13 0.04 1.00
RISK -0.01 0.39 -0.03 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.10 -0.45 0.03 0.70 1.00
RL -0.10 -0.12 0.88 0.09 0.16 0.34 -0.26 -0.45 0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 1.00
ROA -0.08 0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.03 0.32 0.12 0.06 -0.25 0.05 0.92 0.73 -0.11 1.00
ROE -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.45 0.27 -0.09 0.47 1.00
RQ -0.12 -0.02 0.87 0.09 0.30 0.34 -0.37 -0.23 0.10 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.88 -0.07 -0.07 1.00
SIZE -0.37 -0.19 0.17 -0.01 -0.10 0.32 0.11 0.26 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.20 -0.01 0.04 1.00
TANG -0.11 -0.63 0.02 -0.12 0.12 0.04 0.26 -0.23 0.13 0.37 0.06 -0.23 0.14 -0.03 0.09 0.05 0.01 1.00
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Table 12: Results for GCC Sample 
GCC Sample 
Included observations: 117 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2233 1.1750 0.2426 0.1900 
FAM 0.0714 0.5264 0.5997 0.1357 
ROE -0.0396 -0.7027 0.4837 0.0563 
GROWT 0.0389 0.5659 0.5726 0.0688 
SIZE -0.0034 -0.2340 0.8154 0.0144 
TANG 0.1080 1.1768 0.2419 0.0918 
NDTS -0.1456 -0.2246 0.8227 0.6482 
CACL -0.0175*** -3.0429 0.0029 0.0057 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
Table 13: GCC Model Robustness  
GCC Sample 
 
Included observations: 117 
 
Robustness for PROF 
 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1972 1.0921 0.2772 0.1805 C 0.2147 1.1564 0.2501 0.1857 
FAM 0.1029 0.7964 0.4275 0.1292 FAM 0.0881 0.6634 0.5085 0.1328 
ROA -0.8365*** -3.5259 0.0006 0.2372 OI -0.6260** -2.3699 0.0196 0.2642 
GROWT 0.0977 1.4478 0.1505 0.0675 GROWT 0.0961 1.3402 0.1830 0.0717 
SIZE 0.0020 0.1445 0.8854 0.0138 SIZE -0.0006 -0.0408 0.9675 0.0141 
TANG 0.0828 0.9513 0.3436 0.0871 TANG 0.1107 1.2372 0.2187 0.0895 
NDTS 0.0166 0.0269 0.9786 0.6173 NDTS -0.1200 -0.1894 0.8501 0.6337 
CACL -0.0173*** -3.1766 0.0019 0.0054 CACL -0.0177*** -3.1590 0.0020 0.0056 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
Table 14: Robustness for Liquidity 
GCC Sample 
Included observations: 117 
Robustness for LIQU 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.0499 -0.2246 0.8227 0.2219 
FAM 0.0752 0.5289 0.5980 0.1422 
ROE -0.0377 -0.6420 0.5222 0.0587 
GROWT 0.0477 0.6658 0.5069 0.0716 
SIZE 0.0124 0.8456 0.3996 0.0146 
TANG 0.1442 1.1488 0.2531 0.1255 
NDTS 0.0802 0.1182 0.9061 0.6787 
CATA 0.0307 0.2541 0.7999 0.1208 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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2.2 Non-GCC Countries Sample with 99 Observations 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Non-GCC Sample  
  LEV FAM ROE OI ROA GROWT SIZE TANG 
Mean 0.2172 0.3826 -0.2911 0.0355 0.0134 -0.1179 11.1088 0.3310 
Median 0.1943 0.3449 0.0686 0.0367 0.0292 -0.0602 10.8983 0.3032 
Std. Dev. 0.1526 0.2208 3.0265 0.0835 0.1216 0.3990 1.6169 0.2231 
Min 0.0001 0.1001 -29.5089 -0.2784 -0.8548 -2.3165 8.0180 0.0006 
Max 0.795 0.875 3.393 0.286 0.262 1.344 14.864 0.888 
  NDTS CACL CATA RL RQ CC GDP INF 
Mean 0.027 1.651 0.504 0.001 -0.289 -0.135 3.379 3.634 
Median 0.024 1.313 0.539 -0.050 -0.170 -0.110 2.380 1.560 
Std. Dev. 0.020 1.257 0.253 0.422 0.373 0.366 1.986 4.874 
Min 0.000 0.221 0.040 -0.560 -0.800 -0.700 0.800 -0.880 
Max 0.116 10.255 0.984 0.460 0.130 0.260 12.390 10.360 
 
Table 16: Correlation Matrix for Non-GCC Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
CACL CATA CC FAM GDP GROWT ID INF LEV NDTS OI RISK RL ROA ROE RQ SIZE TANG
CACL 1.00
CATA 0.28 1.00
CC 0.12 -0.22 1.00
FAM -0.05 0.07 0.01 1.00
GDP -0.08 -0.09 -0.63 -0.05 1.00
GROWT 0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.13 -0.06 1.00
ID 0.12 0.17 0.37 -0.01 -0.12 0.06 1.00
INF -0.12 0.19 -0.88 -0.03 0.25 -0.09 -0.58 1.00
LEV -0.34 0.14 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.08 1.00
NDTS -0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.03 0.05 1.00
OI 0.27 0.28 -0.17 0.07 -0.05 0.35 -0.01 0.20 -0.25 0.16 1.00
RISK 0.32 0.52 -0.25 -0.02 0.00 0.23 -0.04 0.26 -0.32 0.21 0.77 1.00
RL 0.11 -0.23 1.00 0.02 -0.57 0.10 0.37 -0.91 -0.08 -0.01 -0.18 -0.27 1.00
ROA 0.21 0.17 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.62 0.06 0.04 -0.22 0.08 0.72 0.60 -0.06 1.00
ROE 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 0.14 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 -0.41 0.02 0.08 0.13 -0.01 0.13 1.00
RQ 0.12 -0.22 0.84 0.01 -0.16 0.09 0.59 -0.99 -0.09 0.01 -0.21 -0.27 0.88 -0.04 0.01 1.00
SIZE -0.15 0.04 -0.49 0.09 0.32 -0.18 -0.27 0.44 0.26 -0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.48 -0.02 0.00 -0.44 1.00
TANG -0.30 -0.49 0.01 -0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.31 0.03 0.02 0.24 -0.13 -0.27 0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
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Table 17: Results for Non-GCC Sample 
Non-GCC Sample 
Included observations: 99 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0226 0.2194 0.8268 0.1029 
FAM 0.0329 0.5628 0.5750 0.0585 
ROE -0.0184*** -4.3228 0.0000 0.0043 
GROWT 0.0406 1.2127 0.2284 0.0335 
SIZE 0.0244*** 2.9812 0.0037 0.0082 
TANG -0.0963 -1.5191 0.1323 0.0634 
NDTS 1.1539* 1.7102 0.0907 0.6747 
CACL -0.0256** -2.2895 0.0244 0.0112 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
Table 18: Robustness for Profitability 
Non-GCC Sample      
Included observations: 99  
Robustness for PROF  
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0442 0.3864 0.7001 0.1143 C 0.0437 0.3679 0.7138 0.1187 
FAM 0.0024* 0.0372 0.9704 0.0639 FAM 0.0028 0.0438 0.9652 0.0648 
ROA -0.1193 -0.6503 0.5171 0.1834 OI -0.1042 -0.3683 0.7135 0.2829 
GROWT 0.0536** 1.1446 0.2554 0.0468 GROWT 0.0394 1.0124 0.3141 0.0389 
SIZE 0.0250*** 2.7669 0.0069 0.0090 SIZE 0.0251*** 2.7287 0.0076 0.0092 
TANG -0.1139* -1.6302 0.1066 0.0699 TANG -0.1161 -1.6556 0.1013 0.0701 
NDTS 1.2287 1.6545 0.1015 0.7426 NDTS 1.2674* 1.7113 0.0905 0.7406 
CACL -0.0275* -2.2350 0.0279 0.0123 CACL -0.0277** -2.2423 0.0274 0.0124 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
Table 19: Robustness for Liquidity 
Non-GCC Sample 
Included observations: 99 
Robustness for LIQU 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1854** -1.9460 0.0548 0.0953 
FAM 0.0194 0.3476 0.7290 0.0559 
ROE -0.0167*** -4.0902 0.0001 0.0041 
GROWT 0.0636** 1.9841 0.0503 0.0321 
SIZE 0.0285*** 3.7281 0.0003 0.0076 
TANG 0.0434 0.6629 0.5091 0.0655 
NDTS 0.9893 1.5358 0.1281 0.6441 
CATA 0.2463*** 3.8930 0.0002 0.0633 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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2.3 Consumer-Products Sample with 95 Observations 
Table 20: Consumer-products Sector  
  LEV FAM ROE OI ROA GROWT SIZE TANG 
Mean 0.1912 0.3342 -0.2292 0.0525 0.0415 -0.0412 11.4466 0.4367 
Median 0.1559 0.2748 0.0818 0.0427 0.0449 -0.0164 11.5265 0.4231 
Std. Dev. 0.1896 0.2000 3.0441 0.0858 0.1253 0.3575 1.4714 0.2417 
Min 0.0000 0.1008 -29.5089 -0.2784 -0.8548 -2.3165 8.0180 0.0072 
Max 1.0622 0.8581 0.5510 0.3549 0.3494 1.5750 15.8017 0.9492 
  NDTS CACL CATA RL RQ CC GDP INF 
Mean 0.035 2.470 0.429 0.187 0.034 0.046 3.132 2.827 
Median 0.031 1.313 0.404 0.250 0.030 0.060 3.490 2.150 
Std. Dev. 0.030 3.957 0.230 0.377 0.522 0.406 1.516 3.798 
Min 0.0000 0.1053 0.0019 -0.5600 -0.8000 -0.7000 -0.4000 -0.8800 
Max 0.191 31.381 0.910 0.710 1.130 1.120 12.390 10.360 
 
Table 21: Correlation Matrix for Consumer-products Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
CACL CATA CC FAM GDP GROWT ID INF LEV NDTS OI RISK RL ROA ROE RQ SIZE TANG
CACL 1.00
CATA 0.08 1.00
CC 0.04 -0.11 1.00
FAM 0.09 0.01 -0.11 1.00
GDP -0.18 -0.11 -0.25 -0.04 1.00
GROWT -0.03 0.02 0.32 -0.10 -0.14 1.00
ID 0.11 0.14 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.16 1.00
INF -0.13 0.14 -0.61 0.11 0.21 -0.27 -0.37 1.00
LEV -0.30 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.26 0.03 1.00
NDTS -0.15 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.07 -0.14 0.04 1.00
OI 0.00 0.23 0.09 0.12 -0.04 0.44 0.17 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 1.00
RISK 0.02 0.59 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.21 -0.01 0.13 -0.27 0.04 0.70 1.00
RL 0.09 -0.15 0.92 -0.16 -0.31 0.34 0.14 -0.84 0.03 0.13 0.08 -0.07 1.00
ROA 0.06 0.14 0.19 -0.01 -0.09 0.71 0.15 -0.17 -0.11 0.05 0.73 0.54 0.20 1.00
ROE 0.04 -0.12 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.09 -0.16 -0.06 -0.32 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.14 1.00
RQ 0.07 -0.16 0.88 -0.21 -0.04 0.34 0.06 -0.66 0.07 0.17 0.10 -0.03 0.88 0.20 0.10 1.00
SIZE -0.28 -0.25 -0.13 0.03 0.14 -0.04 0.07 0.32 0.28 -0.04 0.21 0.01 -0.19 0.04 0.02 -0.13 1.00
TANG -0.05 -0.58 -0.03 -0.13 0.25 0.01 0.12 -0.11 -0.02 0.22 -0.12 -0.38 0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.12 0.11 1.00
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Table 22: Results for Consumer-Goods Sector 
Consumer-products Sample 
Included observations: 95 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1675 -1.0930 0.2774 0.1533 
FAM 0.1157 1.2844 0.2024 0.0901 
ROE -0.0214*** -3.6425 0.0005 0.0059 
GROWT 0.0502 1.0125 0.3141 0.0495 
SIZE 0.0299** 2.3769 0.0197 0.0126 
TANG -0.0194 -0.2571 0.7977 0.0756 
NDTS 0.2963 0.4922 0.6238 0.6019 
CACL -0.0109** -2.3147 0.0230 0.0047 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
Table 23: Robustness for Profitability 
Consumer-products Sample    
Included observations: 95     
Robustness for PROF  
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1477 -0.9253 0.3574 0.1597 C -0.1824 -1.1158 0.2676 0.1635 
FAM 0.0856* 0.9178 0.3613 0.0932 FAM 0.1005 1.0595 0.2923 0.0949 
ROA -0.4828 -2.2958 0.0241 0.2103 OI -0.5070** -1.9934 0.0493 0.2543 
GROWT 0.1524* 2.0708 0.0413 0.0736 GROWT 0.0873 1.4836 0.1415 0.0588 
SIZE 0.0329** 2.4869 0.0148 0.0132 SIZE 0.0364*** 2.6484 0.0096 0.0138 
TANG -0.0602* -0.7631 0.4475 0.0788 TANG -0.0709 -0.8835 0.3794 0.0802 
NDTS 0.3124 0.4965 0.6208 0.6292 NDTS 0.3170 0.4995 0.6187 0.6347 
CACL -0.0100*** -2.0233 0.0461 0.0049 CACL -0.0109** -2.1974 0.0306 0.0049 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
Table 24: Robustness for Liquidity 
Consumer-products Sample   
Included observations: 95    
Robustness for LIQU 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.5056*** -2.8378 0.0057 0.1782 
FAM 0.0881 0.9545 0.3425 0.0923 
ROA -0.6435*** -3.0682 0.0029 0.2097 
GROWT 0.1939*** 2.6592 0.0093 0.0729 
SIZE 0.0484*** 3.7776 0.0003 0.0128 
TANG 0.0730 0.7527 0.4537 0.0969 
NDTS 0.2574 0.4124 0.6810 0.6240 
CATA 0.2497** 2.4303 0.0171 0.1027 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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2.4 Non-Consumer-Products Sample with 121 Observations 
Table 25: Non-Consumer-products Sector  
  LEV FAM ROE OI ROA GROWT SIZE TANG 
Mean 0.2117 0.3228 0.0032 0.0397 0.0303 -0.0514 11.4439 0.3276 
Median 0.1839 0.2410 0.0697 0.0388 0.0325 -0.0416 11.5629 0.2764 
Std. Dev. 0.2239 0.2029 0.6381 0.0895 0.0960 0.3956 1.8785 0.2446 
Min 0.0000 0.1000 -4.1250 -0.3034 -0.3622 -2.0095 5.7777 0.0002 
Max 2.0334 0.8751 3.3930 0.2856 0.2618 1.3437 15.6693 0.9765 
  NDTS CACL CATA RL RQ CC GDP INF 
Mean 0.030 2.223 0.495 0.167 0.016 0.032 3.037 2.642 
Median 0.026 1.498 0.537 0.250 0.030 0.060 3.490 1.560 
Std. Dev. 0.032 2.671 0.277 0.384 0.506 0.433 2.063 3.694 
Min 0.000 0.012 0.002 -0.560 -0.800 -0.700 -0.400 -0.880 
Max 0.301 18.609 0.984 0.710 1.130 1.120 12.390 10.360 
 
Table 26: Correlation Matrix for Non-consumer-products sample 
 
 
 
 
 
CACL CATA CC FAM GDP GROWT ID INF LEV NDTS OI RISK RL ROA ROE RQ SIZE TANG
CACL 1.00
CATA 0.25 1.00
CC 0.02 -0.25 1.00
FAM -0.20 0.11 0.01 1.00
GDP 0.02 0.08 -0.24 0.09 1.00
GROWT -0.11 -0.13 0.23 0.02 0.03 1.00
ID 0.04 0.08 -0.18 -0.15 0.03 -0.03 1.00
INF 0.03 0.16 -0.51 -0.06 0.11 -0.05 -0.37 1.00
LEV -0.33 -0.07 -0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 1.00
NDTS -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.20 -0.01 0.06 1.00
OI -0.04 0.10 -0.16 0.02 0.06 0.35 0.13 0.16 -0.23 0.10 1.00
RISK 0.07 0.37 -0.17 0.07 0.08 0.22 0.08 0.20 -0.48 0.10 0.75 1.00
RL 0.01 -0.26 0.92 -0.01 -0.33 0.18 0.02 -0.76 -0.05 0.01 -0.18 -0.21 1.00
ROA -0.03 0.05 -0.15 -0.02 0.03 0.32 0.14 0.17 -0.34 0.10 0.91 0.76 -0.18 1.00
ROE 0.03 -0.01 -0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.13 -0.13 -0.04 0.36 0.24 -0.16 0.38 1.00
RQ 0.02 -0.16 0.86 -0.02 0.01 0.24 0.05 -0.59 -0.04 0.02 -0.13 -0.14 0.84 -0.09 -0.11 1.00
SIZE -0.25 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.19 -0.09 0.27 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.22 -0.09 0.19 0.02 0.06 1.00
TANG -0.18 -0.57 0.15 -0.11 -0.03 0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.18 0.42 0.06 -0.20 0.18 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.03 1.00
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Table 27: Results for Non-consumer-goods sectors 
Non-Consumer-products Sample 
Included observations: 121 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2484* 1.6741 0.0969 0.1484 
FAM -0.0017 -0.0170 0.9864 0.1003 
ROE -0.0431 -1.4044 0.1629 0.0307 
GROWT -0.0043 -0.0841 0.9331 0.0507 
SIZE -0.0009 -0.0826 0.9343 0.0110 
TANG 0.1225 1.3587 0.1770 0.0902 
NDTS -0.2502 -0.3685 0.7132 0.6790 
CACL -0.0263*** -3.3145 0.0012 0.0079 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
Table 28: Robustness for Profitability 
Non-Consumer-products Sample  
Included observations: 121  
Robustness for PROF  
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2109 1.5237 0.1304 0.1384 C 0.2283 1.5850 0.1158 0.1441 
FAM -0.0017 -0.0185 0.9853 0.0933 FAM 0.0141 0.1454 0.8846 0.0973 
ROA -0.9020*** -4.4402 0.0000 0.2031 OI -0.6963*** -3.0475 0.0029 0.2285 
GROWT 0.0583 1.1804 0.2403 0.0494 GROWT 0.0450 0.8655 0.3886 0.0520 
SIZE 0.0048 0.4656 0.6424 0.0104 SIZE 0.0024 0.2187 0.8272 0.0108 
TANG 0.0928 1.1026 0.2725 0.0842 TANG 0.1235 1.4125 0.1605 0.0874 
NDTS 0.1014 0.1597 0.8734 0.6349 NDTS -0.0498 -0.0756 0.9399 0.6595 
CACL -0.0256*** -3.4692 0.0007 0.0074 CACL -0.0257*** -3.3428 0.0011 0.0077 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
 
Table 29: Robustness for Liquidity 
Non-Consumer-products Sample 
Included observations: 121 
Robustness for LIQU 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.0572 -0.3899 0.6973 0.1466 
FAM 0.0711 0.7475 0.4563 0.0951 
ROA -0.9386*** -4.3950 0.0000 0.2136 
GROWT 0.0701 1.3485 0.1802 0.0520 
SIZE 0.0151 1.4383 0.1531 0.0105 
TANG 0.1993* 1.8873 0.0617 0.1056 
NDTS 0.0767 0.1135 0.9098 0.6753 
CATA 0.0752 0.8764 0.3827 0.0859 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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3. Country-specific Factors in all samples 
3.1 Total Sample Results for Country-specific Factors 
Table 30: INMA Regressions for original sample 
Country-Specific Factors 
Included observations: 216 
Included INMA: Rule of Law 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1030 0.9723 0.3320 0.1059 
FAM 0.0686 1.0123 0.3126 0.0677 
ROE -0.0213*** -3.2608 0.0013 0.0065 
GROWT 0.0132 0.3552 0.7228 0.0371 
SIZE 0.0082 0.9962 0.3203 0.0083 
TANG 0.0603 1.0362 0.3013 0.0582 
NDTS -0.0124 -0.0269 0.9786 0.4606 
CACL -0.0173*** -4.0631 0.0001 0.0043 
RL -0.0014 -0.0372 0.9704 0.0373 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F(8,207) 0.26    
Prob. Chi-Sq.(8) 0.257    
Included INMA: Regulatory Effectiveness 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1013 0.9729 0.3317 0.1041 
FAM 0.0705 1.0381 0.3004 0.0679 
ROE -0.0213*** -3.2695 0.0013 0.0065 
GROWT 0.0095 0.2548 0.7991 0.0374 
SIZE 0.0084 1.0231 0.3074 0.0082 
TANG 0.0586 1.0114 0.3130 0.0580 
NDTS -0.0198 -0.0428 0.9659 0.4610 
CACL -0.0174*** -4.0816 0.0001 0.0043 
RQ 0.0087 0.3146 0.7533 0.0277 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F(8,207) 0.1872    
Prob. Chi-Sq.(8) 0.1862    
Included INMA: Control of Corruption 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1053 1.0106 0.3134 0.1041 
FAM 0.0678 1.0022 0.3174 0.0676 
ROE -0.0213*** -3.2692 0.0013 0.0065 
GROWT 0.0189 0.5084 0.6117 0.0372 
SIZE 0.0080 0.9852 0.3257 0.0082 
TANG 0.0624 1.0778 0.2824 0.0579 
NDTS -0.0179 -0.0390 0.9690 0.4602 
CACL -0.0173*** -4.0455 0.0001 0.0043 
CC -0.0203 -0.6098 0.5426 0.0333 
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Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F(8,207) 0.2619    
Prob. Chi-Sq.(8) 0.2588    
Included INMA: GDP Growth 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.1069 1.0146 0.3115 0.1053 
FAM 0.0694 1.0256 0.3063 0.0677 
ROE -0.0211*** -3.2241 0.0015 0.0065 
GROWT 0.0124 0.3453 0.7302 0.0359 
SIZE 0.0084 1.0283 0.3050 0.0082 
TANG 0.0616 1.0604 0.2902 0.0581 
NDTS -0.0210 -0.0455 0.9638 0.4614 
CACL -0.0174*** -4.0789 0.0001 0.0043 
GDP -0.0021 -0.2883 0.7734 0.0074 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F(8,207) 0.2744    
Prob. Chi-Sq.(8) 0.271    
Included INMA: Inflation 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0977 0.9252 0.3559 0.1056 
FAM 0.0687 1.0155 0.3110 0.0677 
ROE -0.0213*** -3.2642 0.0013 0.0065 
GROWT 0.0112 0.3069 0.7593 0.0364 
SIZE 0.0090 1.0447 0.2974 0.0086 
TANG 0.0589 1.0156 0.3110 0.0580 
NDTS -0.0167 -0.0363 0.9711 0.4608 
CACL -0.0174*** -4.0692 0.0001 0.0043 
INF -0.0010 -0.2605 0.7947 0.0038 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Prob. F(8,207) 0.2715    
Prob. Chi-Sq.(8) 0.2681    
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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3.2 GCC Sample Results for Country-specific Factors 
Table 31: INMA Regressions for GCC Sample 
Country-Specific Factors 
Included observations: 117 
Included INMA: Rule of Law 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2200 1.1329 0.2598 0.1942 
FAM 0.0709 0.5198 0.6043 0.1364 
ROE -0.0389 -0.6817 0.4969 0.0570 
GROWT 0.0367 0.5033 0.6158 0.0730 
SIZE -0.0033 -0.2268 0.8210 0.0145 
TANG 0.1067 1.1437 0.2553 0.0933 
NDTS -0.1428 -0.2191 0.8270 0.6519 
CACL -0.0174*** -3.0166 0.0032 0.0058 
RL 0.0086 0.0922 0.9267 0.0931 
Included INMA: Regulatory Effectiveness 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2087 1.0792 0.2829 0.1934 
FAM 0.0699 0.5131 0.6089 0.1363 
ROE -0.0369 -0.6486 0.5180 0.0568 
GROWT 0.0278 0.3792 0.7053 0.0733 
SIZE -0.0027 -0.1855 0.8532 0.0146 
TANG 0.1064 1.1543 0.2509 0.0922 
NDTS -0.1419 -0.2182 0.8277 0.6507 
CACL -0.0172*** -2.9743 0.0036 0.0058 
RQ 0.0235 0.4513 0.6527 0.0521 
Included INMA: Control of Corruption 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2214 1.1612 0.2481 0.1907 
FAM 0.0759 0.5564 0.5791 0.1364 
ROE -0.0413 -0.7299 0.4670 0.0566 
GROWT 0.0489 0.6831 0.4960 0.0715 
SIZE -0.0028 -0.1942 0.8464 0.0145 
TANG 0.1099 1.1924 0.2357 0.0922 
NDTS -0.1697 -0.2602 0.7952 0.6520 
CACL -0.0175*** -3.0455 0.0029 0.0058 
CC -0.0306 -0.5252 0.6005 0.0583 
Included INMA: GDP Growth 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2436 1.2210 0.2247 0.1995 
FAM 0.0745 0.5459 0.5863 0.1366 
ROE -0.0401 -0.7096 0.4795 0.0566 
GROWT 0.0411 0.5934 0.5542 0.0693 
SIZE -0.0041 -0.2810 0.7792 0.0146 
TANG 0.1119 1.2055 0.2307 0.0929 
NDTS -0.1528 -0.2346 0.8149 0.6512 
CACL -0.0176*** -3.0469 0.0029 0.0058 
GDP -0.0048 -0.3487 0.7280 0.0137 
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Included INMA: Inflation 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2110 1.0891 0.2786 0.1937 
FAM 0.0677 0.4954 0.6213 0.1366 
ROE -0.0365 -0.6390 0.5242 0.0571 
GROWT 0.0321 0.4488 0.6545 0.0715 
SIZE -0.0013 -0.0840 0.9332 0.0156 
TANG 0.0995 1.0471 0.2974 0.0951 
NDTS -0.1374 -0.2110 0.8333 0.6512 
CACL -0.0172*** -2.9629 0.0037 0.0058 
INF -0.0044 -0.3651 0.7157 0.0120 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
3.3 Non-GCC Sample Results for Country-specific Factors 
Table 32: INMA Regressions for Non-GCC Sample 
Country-Specific Factors 
Included observations: 99 
Included INMA: Rule of Law 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0380 0.3327 0.7401 0.1143 
FAM 0.0344 0.5824 0.5618 0.0590 
ROE -0.0184*** -4.2980 0.0000 0.0043 
GROWT 0.0419 1.2364 0.2196 0.0339 
SIZE 0.0231** 2.5011 0.0142 0.0092 
TANG -0.0977 -1.5293 0.1297 0.0639 
NDTS 1.1595* 1.7093 0.0909 0.6783 
CACL -0.0250** -2.2040 0.0301 0.0114 
RL -0.0116 -0.3174 0.7517 0.0366 
Included INMA: Regulatory Effectiveness 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0419 0.3889 0.6983 0.1078 
FAM 0.0349 0.5938 0.5541 0.0588 
ROE -0.0183*** -4.2776 0.0000 0.0043 
GROWT 0.0432 1.2761 0.2052 0.0338 
SIZE 0.0222** 2.4759 0.0152 0.0090 
TANG -0.1005 -1.5706 0.1198 0.0640 
NDTS 1.1853* 1.7460 0.0843 0.6789 
CACL -0.0244** -2.1522 0.0341 0.0114 
RQ -0.0254 -0.6269 0.5323 0.0404 
Included INMA: Control of Corruption 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0323 0.2870 0.7748 0.1125 
FAM 0.0339 0.5751 0.5667 0.0590 
ROE -0.0184*** -4.3030 0.0000 0.0043 
GROWT 0.0415 1.2243 0.2241 0.0339 
SIZE 0.0235** 2.5252 0.0133 0.0093 
TANG -0.0971 -1.5213 0.1317 0.0639 
NDTS 1.1555* 1.7034 0.0920 0.6784 
CACL -0.0252** -2.2186 0.0291 0.0114 
CC -0.0093 -0.2198 0.8265 0.0423 
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Included INMA: GDP Growth 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0175 0.1694 0.8658 0.1032 
FAM 0.0276 0.4685 0.6406 0.0589 
ROE -0.0178*** -4.1212 0.0001 0.0043 
GROWT 0.0396 1.1798 0.2412 0.0335 
SIZE 0.0268*** 3.1120 0.0025 0.0086 
TANG -0.0905 -1.4181 0.1597 0.0638 
NDTS 1.1378* 1.6841 0.0957 0.6756 
CACL -0.0258** -2.3095 0.0232 0.0112 
GDP -0.0062 -0.9049 0.3679 0.0068 
Included INMA: Inflation 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0386 0.3568 0.7221 0.1083 
FAM 0.0351 0.5951 0.5533 0.0589 
ROE -0.0183*** -4.2808 0.0000 0.0043 
GROWT 0.0425 1.2565 0.2122 0.0338 
SIZE 0.0226** 2.5083 0.0139 0.0090 
TANG -0.1008 -1.5676 0.1205 0.0643 
NDTS 1.1898* 1.7461 0.0842 0.6814 
CACL -0.0247** -2.1773 0.0321 0.0114 
INF 0.0015 0.4973 0.6202 0.0031 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
3.4 Consumer-Products Sample Results for Country-specific Factors 
Table 33: INMA Regressions for Consumer-Products Sample 
Country-Specific Factors 
Included observations: 95 
Included INMA: Rule of Law 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.2074 -1.3255 0.1885 0.1564 
FAM 0.1295 1.4294 0.1565 0.0906 
ROE -0.0218*** -3.7148 0.0004 0.0059 
GROWT 0.0294 0.5621 0.5755 0.0523 
SIZE 0.0324** 2.5459 0.0127 0.0127 
TANG -0.0227 -0.3005 0.7645 0.0755 
NDTS 0.2134 0.3531 0.7249 0.6043 
CACL -0.0113** -2.4130 0.0179 0.0047 
RL 0.0616 1.2008 0.2331 0.0513 
Included INMA: Regulatory Effectiveness 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1916 -1.2584 0.2117 0.1522 
FAM 0.1441 1.5902 0.1155 0.0906 
ROE -0.0222*** -3.8113 0.0003 0.0058 
GROWT 0.0216 0.4175 0.6774 0.0517 
SIZE 0.0319** 2.5519 0.0125 0.0125 
TANG -0.0296 -0.3941 0.6945 0.0750 
NDTS 0.1443 0.2399 0.8110 0.6018 
CACL -0.0116** -2.4932 0.0146 0.0047 
RQ 0.0635* 1.7185 0.0893 0.0370 
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Included INMA: Control of Corruption 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1845 -1.1915 0.2367 0.1549 
FAM 0.1224 1.3513 0.1801 0.0906 
ROE -0.0216*** -3.6665 0.0004 0.0059 
GROWT 0.0370 0.7110 0.4790 0.0520 
SIZE 0.0310** 2.4458 0.0165 0.0127 
TANG -0.0165 -0.2176 0.8283 0.0758 
NDTS 0.2701 0.4474 0.6557 0.6037 
CACL -0.0110** -2.3356 0.0218 0.0047 
CC 0.0387 0.8385 0.4041 0.0461 
Included INMA: GDP Growth 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1731 -1.0999 0.2744 0.1574 
FAM 0.1163 1.2834 0.2028 0.0907 
ROE -0.0215*** -3.5954 0.0005 0.0060 
GROWT 0.0516 1.0220 0.3096 0.0505 
SIZE 0.0298** 2.3537 0.0209 0.0127 
TANG -0.0230 -0.2925 0.7706 0.0788 
NDTS 0.3151 0.5126 0.6096 0.6147 
CACL -0.0107** -2.2258 0.0286 0.0048 
GDP 0.0022 0.1756 0.8610 0.0127 
Included INMA: Inflation 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C -0.1939 -1.2452 0.2164 0.1557 
FAM 0.1218 1.3486 0.1810 0.0903 
ROE -0.0216*** -3.6778 0.0004 0.0059 
GROWT 0.0369 0.7184 0.4745 0.0514 
SIZE 0.0338** 2.5597 0.0122 0.0132 
TANG -0.0282 -0.3699 0.7124 0.0762 
NDTS 0.2367 0.3911 0.6967 0.6052 
CACL -0.0112** -2.3834 0.0194 0.0047 
INF -0.0050 -0.9734 0.3331 0.0052 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
3.5 Non-Consumer-Products Sample Results for Country-specific Factors 
Table 34: INMA Regressions for Non-Consumer-Products Sample 
Country-Specific Factors 
Included observations: 121 
Included INMA: Rule of Law 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2670 1.7874 0.0766 0.1494 
FAM -0.0017 -0.0166 0.9868 0.1002 
ROE -0.0489 -1.5691 0.1194 0.0312 
GROWT 0.0063 0.1212 0.9037 0.0516 
SIZE -0.0021 -0.1881 0.8511 0.0111 
TANG 0.1406 1.5325 0.1282 0.0917 
NDTS -0.3084 -0.4529 0.6515 0.6809 
CACL -0.0260*** -3.2702 0.0014 0.0079 
RL -0.0567 -1.0539 0.2942 0.0538 
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Included INMA: Regulatory Effectiveness 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2431 1.6329 0.1053 0.1489 
FAM -0.0018 -0.0184 0.9854 0.1005 
ROE -0.0459 -1.4816 0.1413 0.0310 
GROWT 0.0048 0.0925 0.9264 0.0523 
SIZE -0.0006 -0.0544 0.9567 0.0111 
TANG 0.1295 1.4256 0.1568 0.0909 
NDTS -0.2682 -0.3939 0.6944 0.6808 
CACL -0.0259*** -3.2414 0.0016 0.0080 
RQ -0.0294 -0.7280 0.4681 0.0404 
     
Included INMA: Control of Corruption 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2383 1.6105 0.1101 0.1480 
FAM 0.0026 0.0257 0.9795 0.0999 
ROE -0.0494 -1.5996 0.1125 0.0309 
GROWT 0.0123 0.2364 0.8136 0.0518 
SIZE -0.0004 -0.0407 0.9676 0.0110 
TANG 0.1451 1.5899 0.1147 0.0912 
NDTS -0.3491 -0.5135 0.6086 0.6799 
CACL -0.0254*** -3.2032 0.0018 0.0079 
CC -0.0662 -1.3946 0.1659 0.0475 
Included INMA: GDP Growth 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2474 1.6458 0.1026 0.1503 
FAM -0.0022 -0.0222 0.9823 0.1012 
ROE -0.0431 -1.3993 0.1645 0.0308 
GROWT -0.0043 -0.0851 0.9323 0.0509 
SIZE -0.0009 -0.0846 0.9327 0.0111 
TANG 0.1226 1.3532 0.1787 0.0906 
NDTS -0.2507 -0.3676 0.7139 0.6821 
CACL -0.0263*** -3.2981 0.0013 0.0080 
GDP 0.0005 0.0543 0.9568 0.0096 
Included INMA: Inflation 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.2602 1.7301 0.0864 0.1504 
FAM 0.0006 0.0057 0.9955 0.1007 
ROE -0.0454 -1.4608 0.1469 0.0311 
GROWT -0.0015 -0.0296 0.9764 0.0511 
SIZE -0.0027 -0.2366 0.8134 0.0116 
TANG 0.1260 1.3900 0.1673 0.0907 
NDTS -0.2565 -0.3766 0.7072 0.6812 
CACL -0.0266*** -3.3331 0.0012 0.0080 
INF 0.0031 0.5486 0.5844 0.0056 
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
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4. Controlling for Country as Robustness for Family Ownership Insignificance 
Table 35: Results for Controlling for Countries 
Controlling for Countries 
Included observations: 216 
Dependent Variable: LEV 
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Prob. SE. 
C 0.0186 0.1100 0.9125        0.1690  
DUM EGYPT 0.0739 0.6233 0.5338        0.1185  
DUM DUBAI 0.0325 0.2374 0.8126        0.1369  
DUM JORDAN 0.0597 0.5019 0.6163        0.1189  
DUM OMAN 0.1716 1.4494 0.1488        0.1184  
DUM ABUDHABI -0.0602 -0.5081 0.6119        0.1184  
DUM KSA 0.1081 0.9188 0.3593        0.1177  
DUM KUWAIT 0.1182 0.9603 0.3381        0.1231  
DUM MOROCCO 0.1264 1.0230 0.3075        0.1235  
DUM TUNISIA 0.0904 0.6927 0.4893        0.1305  
DUM PALESTINE 0.0065 0.0411 0.9673        0.1591  
FAM 0.0624 0.9167 0.3604        0.0681  
ROE -0.02092*** -3.1780 0.0017        0.0066  
GROWT 0.0153 0.4300 0.6677        0.0356  
SIZE 0.0088 0.9221 0.3576        0.0095  
TANG 0.0650 1.0733 0.2844        0.0606  
NDTS -0.2698 -0.5676 0.5709        0.4753  
CACL -0.009666** -2.1144 0.0357        0.0046  
Main significance level used is 5% in all regressions that have been run. However in regression results’ tables * is for significance at 10%, ** 
5%, and *** 1%. 
 
